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ABSTRACT

This journal presents new perspectives and materials on Japan that are engaging, relatively jargon-free, and shaped so that their usefulness in a college classroom is readily apparent. The journal represents an example of the potential for genuine scholarship that lies within interdisciplinary studies. Articles grouped under the topic of "Minority Issues" are: "White and Yellow in California: Race Hatred and the Issei" (Michael Steiner); and "The Jewish Factor in Relations between the United States and Japan" (Naoki Maruyama). Articles grouped under "Religious Issues" are: "Mahikari beyond Japan" (W. Sanborn Pfeiffer); and "Missionary versus Atheist: James Curtis Hepburn and Edward Sylvester Morse as Foreign Technical Experts in Meiji Japan" (Jonathan Goldstein). Articles grouped under "Conflict Issues" are: "An Unequal Alliance: United States-Japanese Postwar Relations, The Mutual Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960" (Arlene Lazarowitz); "The Social Significance of the Japanese Tea Ceremony" (Mohamed D. Turay); "Stress Management and Conflict Resolution via the Way of Tea" (Sheila Fling); and "From Harmony to Confrontation in Japanese Advertising" (Joseph P. Helgert) Contains one book and one film review. (BT)

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Japan Studies Association Journal

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This volume of the *Japan Studies Association Journal* is dedicated
to the memory of
Dr. Alvin D. Coox, Historian, Author, and Teacher

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All business correspondence should be addressed to:
Japan Studies Association
Department of History
Northwest Missouri State University
Maryville, MO 64468

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IN MEMORIAM

Alvin D. Coox

Al's credentials as a Japan scholar, his many publications, his years of teaching at San Diego State University are well known facts of his life. However, hundreds of us remember him most fondly as a friend, a teacher, and a mentor.

These are reflections of the alumni of the Japan Studies Institute which Al founded and guided for 13 years. The way we saw Al was as that ever-dedicated teacher and mentor to over 200 teachers who had no previous background in Japan Studies. What he did was to take that spark of interest in Japan and fan the flames of intellectual pursuit hopefully to turn us into respectful scholars at our own academic institutions.

Most of us arrived in San Diego for our first meeting with Al at his institute thinking it was going to be 4 weeks of casual workshops in sunny southern California. Little did we anticipate the rigorous agenda Al had planned for us. He kept new and exciting topics before us each day and we were amazed at the variety of speakers and cultural programs we were exposed to over the weeks. Sessions would sometimes go into the night with presentations and discussions of famous Japanese films.

Throughout it all, Al prodded us to think of how to use the Institute experience in our own disciplines on our home campus and incorporate Japanese Studies into our curriculum. His impact became clear as many of us continued to read Japanese history and culture books after the Institute had completed.

When the alumni of the Summer Institutes wanted to form an organization Al was ready with sage advise. He wanted the group to be professional and would accept nothing less from our efforts. The many long pone calls, agonizing over what many would perceive as minor points and discussing all issues at length were Al's ever continuing contribution to all of us who wanted to see the Japan Studies Institute grow and continue to be a force in our life. With his encouragement the Japan Studies Association was formed in 1995 as a way to carry on the work that Al had begun at the Japan Studies Institute. Al Coox was truly a professor's professor.

Joseph L. Overton
Thomas W. Carneal

FROM THE EDITOR

This is my first volume as editor of the *Japan Studies Association Journal* and I would like to take the opportunity to update the JSA members and journal readers on some recent developments. The first two volumes of the journal, under the skillful editorship of Richard Speaker, Jr. and Louise Myers, provided interesting professional articles on a variety of topics related to Japan studies. Those volumes were intended primarily for the JSA membership but the articles deserved a wider readership. One of my first tasks as editor for volume 3 was to find a way to make the journal available to a wider readership. I believe that has been accomplished by securing an International Standard Serial Number (ISSN) for the journal. Assignment of an ISSN provides the possibility for inclusion of the journal articles in professional indexes, which in turn allows libraries to subscribe to the journal. I am pleased to announce that beginning with this volume, the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Sciences Education will review the JSA Journal articles for coverage in the ERIC database.

I would also like to express my appreciation to members of the Editorial Board for this volume. Professors Ball, Hume, Myers, Lindsey, Littlejohn, and Wolf each reviewed several of the manuscripts submitted for consideration and provided helpful suggestions for those papers that eventually were accepted for inclusion. And, of course, were it not for the authors who chose the *Japan Studies Association Journal* as the way to disseminate their research, there would be no volume to be discussing. As you will see, the articles comprising this volume cover a wide range of topics. That is one of the most appealing features of the Japan Studies Association, which has a cross-disciplinary membership with a common interest in Japan. Divergent as the article topics are, you will find the Japan theme to be featured in each. I hope you enjoy the opportunity to broaden your knowledge of the many different aspects of Japan history, culture, and influence covered in these articles.

ARTICLE CONTRIBUTORS

Sheila Fling

Sheila Fling, PhD in Clinical Psychology from the University of Austin, is a professor at Southwest Texas State University, where her courses include one on The Japanese Psyche for honors students. Interested in Japan since childhood, she has relished opportunities to study its religions, history, language, arts, dance, etc. She has studied the "Way of Tea" for the past 9 years. She attended the Japan Studies Institute in 1993. She has made about 7 visits for a total of about 3 years' living and traveling in Japan. She was Director of the International Division of the Aoibashi Family Clinic in Kyoto and taught at the Osaka International University for Women. Her Japanese-related research has included the Japanese psyche, Morita and Naikan therapies, meditation, "chado", and comparing Japanese and Americans on workaholism, anger management, and mental skills in golf. She serves on the boards of directors for the Austin-Oita Sister City Committee and the Japan America Society of Austin.

Jonathan Goldstein

Dr. Jonathan Goldstein is Professor of History at the State University of West Georgia, Carrollton, Georgia, where his courses include China, Vietnam, and, as a result of the Japan Studies Institute, Japan. Dr. Goldstein participated in the 1989 JSI San Diego Institute and the 1990 JSI on-site seminar in Japan, both directed by the late Dr. Alvin Coox. Dr. Goldstein's books include *America Views China* (1992); *The Jews of China* (1999), and *China and Israel 1948-1998: a Fifty Year Retrospective* (1999).

Joseph P. Helgert

Professor Helgert has lived in both the Osaka and Tokyo areas, worked in a large corporation, studied at Oberlin College and conducted research; all in Japan. As an associate professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, Professor Helgert has taught in the advertising and public relations area. Currently he is on leave from GVSU and is professor of interdisciplinary studies at the University of Arizona. There he teaches courses in international management and culture. He attended the Japan Studies Institute in 1997. His current research interests include advertising agency practice in Japan.

Arlene Lazarowitz

Arlene Lazarowitz, who holds a doctorate in the history of twentieth century United States politics and foreign policy from the University of California, Los Angeles, has taught in the History Department at California State University, Long Beach since 1984. In addition to her teaching, she advises students in the Social Science credential program and directs the Jewish Studies program. She attended a Japan Studies Institute in 1998, where she began work on this manuscript.

Naoki Maruyama

Naoki Maruyama received degrees in politics from Waseda University (B.A.) and in law from Hitotsubashi University (M.A.). He teaches international politics at Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, where he has been professor since 1991. He has just completed research on the Jewish communities in Shanghai. His works include *The Shanghai Zionist Association and the International Politics of East Asia Until 1936*; and *Japan's Economic Crisis: Crisis Decision-Making in the 1973 Oil "Shokku."*

W. Sanborn Pfeiffer

Sandy Pfeiffer received degrees in English from Amherst College (B.A.) and Kent State University (M.A., Ph.D.). He teaches Japan Culture, Technical Communication, and International Communication at Southern Polytechnic State University in Atlanta, where he has been a faculty member since 1980 and a department head for eleven years. Sandy has three communication textbooks in print, one in a fourth edition. He attended the Japan Studies Institute in 1996 and has participated in two field studies in Japan, one sponsored by the Japan Foundation and the East-West Center (1994) and the other by the Fulbright Commission (1998).

Michael Steiner

Michael Steiner received his Ph.D. in American Studies from Saint Louis University in 1997. Following a ten-year tenure teaching high school in St. Louis he became an Assistant Professor of History at Northwest Missouri State University. He currently directs the Social Science Education Program at Northwest, teaches courses in American History with varied research interests, and expands his interests in Japan. Mike attended the Japan Studies Institute in the summer of 1998, and currently serves as the Secretary of the Japan Studies Association. Next summer he will serve as a visiting lecturer in American Studies at Niigata University of International and Information Studies in Niigata, Japan.

Mohamed D. Turay

Mohamed Turay is Associate Professor of Sociology at Savannah State University. He received his Masters and Doctorate degrees from Howard University. Professor Turay attended the Japan Studies Institute in 1994 and his research interests include Southeast Asia and Japan.

White and Yellow in California: Race Hatred and the Issei

Michael Steiner
Northwest Missouri State University

As America entered the 20th Century it resonated with a potent growth that brought dramatic benefits for the American people, increased standards of living, and enhanced the nation's ability to advance its interests throughout the world. At the same time, however, this growth was also propelled by heightened attitudes of white cultural and racial supremacy and the corollary among millions of Americans of racial hatred for nonwhites. Most often this hatred is observed in its expression toward blacks, but it was leveled as well at every other nonwhite community in the country, including the Japanese, who had the unfortunate timing of coming in their first large wave of immigration in this very period. As a result, the Japanese Issei, who landed primarily in California in the years from 1885-1924, faced a hostile white population who immediately mounted the barricades to drive them back off American soil and prevent any further entrance. Many whites who sought to eliminate Japanese immigration framed opposition to Japanese settlement in terms of a variety of practical and economic issues, but the rhetoric of hostile Californians revealed that they opposed the immigrants fundamentally because of their race. While the Japanese were certainly not without defenders, or their own voice, the purpose of this article is to examine the arguments and attitudes of those in California who wanted to drive them out through a campaign of anti-Japanese racism that was equal in its vehemence to that aimed at any other minority group in American life.

Anti-Asian racism in America was not at all new at the turn of the century. The first Asians to immigrate in large numbers, the Chinese, from their initial arrival in the 1850s met with considerable bigotry. Anti-Chinese bias however was muted in part at first by the fact that they had been attracted to California largely by Americans as a solution to a labor shortage—providing cheap labor for mining and railroad companies, and filling jobs that hopeful white prospectors at first did not want. As Chinese labor became more superfluous to industry, and a source of competition for failed miners settling into wage labor, however, Californians pressured successfully in 1888 to halt the flow of Chinese immigrants. Throughout their first phase of immigration Chinese Americans confronted the worst that racism could offer; from stereotyping as dirty uncivilized "coolies" even while their labor was in high demand, to increasing physical violence and even lynching as that demand decreased (Takaki, 1993, pp. 191-221; Zo, 1973). With the onset of exclusion in 1888, those already in America dug in their heels and weathered the hostile climate, then watched in the mid-1880s as the first Japanese began to move in, only to face the same problems.

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Japanese immigration to American differed from earlier Chinese immigration in a number of ways. It originated in Japan with much less organized American efforts to attract Japanese immigrants here. The Japanese also sought different roles. Most importantly they wanted land ownership to farm (Takaki, 1993, pp. 246-276). Their entry was complicated by the fact too that they entered at a point when national interests of Japan and the United States began to grate over trade in the Pacific and Japan's growing interest in imperialism. Perhaps the most important difference in Japanese immigration was the problem of timing. Through much of the second half of the nineteenth century, American culture drifted further in the direction of a nationalism which asserted not only the brilliance and power of American civilization, but one which defined superiority in cultural, religious, and most importantly racial terms; regardless of location, income level, occupations, or motivation, Americans were finding racism fashionable (Madsen, 1998).

By the turn of the century, Californians—especially those living in the northern part of the state—began to feed on alarmist assumptions that Japanese immigrants were transforming the west coast population and threatening to inundate the state with Asians. The *San Francisco Chronicle* established itself at the fore of the fear-mongering by posting headlines in February of 1905 proclaiming "The Japanese Invasion, The Problem of The Hour and Crime and Poverty Go Hand in Hand With Asiatic Labor" (Nakano, 1990, p. 30). Editor of the *Chronicle*, John P. Young (1909), warned in the pages of the scholarly *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, that "by 1905 not less than 35,000 of the little brown men [a common derogatory label used among turn-of-the-century San Franciscans for the Japanese] have come to the state and remained here" (p. 233). By 1909 he estimated the population of Japanese in the United States at 100,000. In the same year the Asiatic Exclusion League posted even more dire and substantially inflated estimates at 130,000. The League further claimed that imminent industrialization in Asia would send far greater masses of unemployed to the U.S. (Macarthur, 1909). The *Chronicle* threatened that the current trends were leading toward a "complete 'orientalization' of the Pacific Coast states and territories" (Young, 1909, p. 235).

The product of these collective fears in California was action at local and state levels to stem the influence of the Japanese. In March 1905 the California state Senate and Assembly passed a concurrent resolution requesting the United States Congress to "diminish to a marked degree the further immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States." Young noted that though the resolution specifically targeted "laborers" it was not driven by labor interests in California and commented that "up to the date of the adoption of the . . . resolution . . . no labor organization in San Francisco or on the Pacific Coast had expressed itself on the subject" (p. 235). Congress, however, was not concerned enough about the issue in 1905 to take action. To the contrary, Congress wanted to continue building favorable relations with the Japanese government.

Failing support from the federal government, it was at the state and local levels that Californians began to act on their fears, and implement policies designed to isolate those Japanese already in America, and prevent any more from immigrating. Seldom do local school boards make decisions that result in profound implications for national policy and international relations. But such was the case with the San Francisco School Board in 1905 when it decided to segregate Japanese students in the public school system, instigating a seminal event in the concerted movement toward exclusion of the Japanese. The board's resolution, passed in May 1905 and made effective in the Fall of 1906 under a state statute which permitted it to do so, presented a clearly racist rationale for the segregation. The resolution stated that it was necessary "not only for the purpose of relieving the congestion at present prevailing in our schools, but also for the higher end that our children should not be placed in any position where their youthful impressions may be affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian race" ("The Exclusion of Japanese Children," 1906, p. 537). But as would be often the case with the opponents to Japanese immigration, San Franciscans also buttressed the policy with a host of arguments designed to make the policy appear to be one of practical necessity.

The most commonly held position was that the Japanese who were in the schools were too old to be in company with their elementary-aged classmates (Roosevelt, 1906). C. W. Fulton, a United States senator from Oregon, defended the policy by arguing that the principal motive for San Francisco's segregation was that "those seeking admission to the schools were very largely adults, who, because they were beginners, necessarily entered the primary grades and were in consequence brought into intimate association with the young white children of those grades." And later that "adult Japanese largely flocked to the primary grades of the schools attended by white children"(Fulton, 1906, p. 1225). Mr. Roncovieri, the superintendent of the San Francisco schools argued that "ninety-five per cent of these so-called Japanese children are young men," and repeated the popular defense that "we object to an adult Japanese sitting beside a twelve-year-old school girl." While many Americans were impressed by this line of argument, it was based on the stock in trade of race hatred—gross exaggeration. Since it was immediately clear that the measure was going to insult the Japanese, President Roosevelt dispatched the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Victor Metcalf, to San Francisco to conduct an inquiry into the conflict over the school board order and anti-Japanese feelings in the city. Metcalf's first discovery was that the notion of young Japanese men sitting in class next to little white girls was entirely false ("Provisions of the Treaty," 1906, p. 537). In 1909 *The Outlook* magazine reported that at the time of the segregation order there were only 93 Japanese students in the primary schools of San Francisco—a little over one per building; one third of these were U.S. born; the vast majority were under age 15, and only two were as old as twenty ("A Senseless Insult to a Friendly Nation," 1909). Indeed the superintendent revealed much more fully his real motivations when he commented of the situation that "the Asiatic must

understand now and for all time that he cannot insist on a personal association of his children with those of the white race" (Inglis, 1907, p. 83).

The Japanese in California appealed immediately to local officials and to the Japanese consul in California for a reversal of the policy. A representative of the consulate attended a special hearing of the board to appeal the decision, arguing that it would place particular hardship on young Japanese Americans who were trying to assimilate themselves ("The Exclusion of Japanese Children," 1906). In Washington, Japanese officials notified Roosevelt that they were insulted, and that unless the federal government interceded, negotiations between the U.S. and Japan over much larger and more volatile issues might be endangered. Others also came to the defense of the Japanese. A Reverend Dr. Johnson, representative of the Interdenominational Missions Congress, attended the school board hearings, following their decision to segregate, and opposed the actions as "unjust, unwise, un-American, untimely, un-Christianlike, and unfair" ("The Exclusion of Japanese Children," 1906, p. 537).

The School Board of San Francisco had done much more than merely segregate 93 Japanese students into an "Asian" school; it had chosen to create an international diplomatic flap. Californians who supported the segregation order defended their position by arguing that the Japanese government was meddlesome and overly sensitive, that the American people east of the Sierra Nevada could not understand their position, and that the United States government would be abusing its power if it attempted to nullify the order. C.W. Fulton (1906) laid blame upon the Japanese government for the turmoil that followed the decision, arguing that this would be an issue "of little moment or concern" had the Japanese government not complained. So, in his view the debate that followed in the U.S. was not a moral question, but one simply planted by a meddlesome outside power (p. 1226). Edward Hungerford (1913), writing for *Harper's Weekly* about "why the little man from little Nippon is giving the big state of California a fearfully bad time," argued that one need only see the problem through the eyes of the Californians to sympathize with their situation. Citing a number of communities with a "Japanese problem," he says of Florin, California that it is "one of the richest agricultural districts upon the continent. It grows strawberries and Tokay grapes, chiefly the former" and that "recently it has added another crop—little flat-faced, brown-skinned children" (p.13). As a Southerner, Hungerford endorsed the strong similarities to anti-black racism in the south, adding that "your Californian is not more particular as to mingling with the brown man than our own beloved South has been about mingling with the black man" (p.13).

Ultimately a number of observers discovered in San Francisco the same nationalistic bravado being used by Americans to justify imperialism throughout the world. William Inglis (1907) argued in *Harpers' Weekly* that the San Franciscans were more concerned with driving a corrupt local administration out of power than a possible threat from the Japanese. He quotes one local editor who

dismissed the Japanese threat by commenting that "we're too big for the Japs. They'll bother us a lot at first, but then our superior weight and money will tell. . . . Never mind the Japanese. We'll attend to them sooner or later" (p. 82). Inglis, who had been stationed in Japan with *Harpers* argued that Californians' willingness to risk war with Japan over the immigrant issue was really rooted in psychological rather than political or economic conditions

Following San Francisco's initiative, the California state legislature considered bills which would segregate Japanese students in all public schools throughout the state and place severe limitations on Japanese immigration. The state legislature's actions were tentative, however, as the act for statewide segregation passed in the lower house of the legislature but failed in the state Senate. *The Outlook* noted that no argument had been made in the state House or Senate that the Japanese students were a real problem in the schools (especially since they were so few in number), and one writer concluded that "it is perfectly clear that the proposal to segregate Japanese scholars comes, not because of their number or conduct, but as part of a racial crusade" ("Senseless Insult to a Friendly Nation," 1909, pp. 315-316).

While the exclusion movement faltered at first, the San Francisco school incident set the groundwork for serious efforts to exclude the Japanese. Inglis (1907) commented that "everyone who understands the situation admits frankly that the exclusion of Japanese from the public schools was only the beginning of a general movement to exclude the race from California" (p. 82). And while the actions of the San Francisco School Board should have merely stood as the foolish act of a local authority, the incident provided the opportunity for a much larger campaign of racist ideology in America, particularly in the west, aimed ultimately at the exclusion of Asians from the United States.

As the exclusion movement built momentum at the close of the first decade of the twentieth century, its proponents continued to offer a variety of practical and economic concerns as rationale, but always they came back to the simple factor of race. The editor of the North American Review began an article entitled "Races Cannot Mingle" (1906) by offering support for California exclusionists on the basis of land holding laws, labor conditions, citizenship, and the constitutionality of federal authority. But as so many others did, he boiled his argument down to the simple issue of race, concluding that "treaty or no treaty, the American people will never admit to full personal association a race, however worthy, which they regard as inherently so alien that attempt at commingling could only result in disastrous failure" (p. 1203).

In the midst of debate in the state legislature over a bill that would prohibit alien ownership of land the issue of race reared its head and gave momentum to a bill that was facing serious opposition. Following a number of speeches in opposition a farmer was granted the floor. According to an observer the farmer nervously and hastily said "my neighbor is a Jap. He has an eighty-acre place next to mine and he is a smart fellow. He has a white woman living in his house and upon that

white woman's knee is a baby. Now what is that baby? It isn't white. It isn't Japanese. I'll tell you what it is. It is the beginning of a problem—the biggest problem that the world has ever known." A writer for the *North American Review* claimed that "in that instant every objection to the bill was swept from the minds of California's legislators" (Hungerford, 1913, p. 13).

The crucial factor, according to Hungerford, was not economic competition, or the principle of alien ownership of land, but the fear of racial intermixture. A writer for *Harper's Weekly* also intoned the nationalist defense, asserting that "self-preservation demands that a nation, whatever its traditions, shall have the power to exclude dangerous importations, whether bug, bird, beast, fish, seed, microbe, or human creature" (*Harper's Weekly*, December 1906, p. 1699). The editor of the San Francisco *Chronicle* claimed that they faced a "very general opposition . . . because the people are profoundly convinced that only by their exclusion can the white man's civilization be preserved on the Pacific coast" (Young, 1909, p. 238).

Unfortunately, as the debate in California drew national media attention, Easterners were increasingly willing to accept this argument as a plausible rationale for going along with the Californians. *Harper's Weekly* claimed that in fact the Japanese cause little trouble in California. With regards to law and order and economic turmoil, they expected more trouble from white labor unions who the magazine believed were holding the city hostage in the wake of the earth quake that had devastated the city in 1906. *Harper's* concluded that the Japanese did not really deserve any accommodation though because they "will not become Americans. They will neither wish to merge with our people nor shall we wish to have them. They are not our kind" (*Harper's Weekly*, December 1906, p. 1699).

A number of anti-Japanese propagandists appealed to growing American fears of "race-mixing" as a powerful argument for exclusion (Osumi, 1982). One such figure, Montaville Flowers of Monrovia, California, published a book in 1913 that argued that sensible Americans had been blinded by a "conquest of American opinion" by Japanese propagandists and diplomats. The real danger in this ultimately, according to Flowers (1917), was not the secondary issues of labor, land holding, and access to public services, but the long-term degeneration of the Anglo-American stock that would result from intermarriage. He argued that Americans at the dawn of the twentieth century were faced with a crucial decision: "one way leads to clearer definition of its character and civilization, which will preserve and renew its own racial soul for long life; the other way transgresses every natural law and . . . leads to the loss of its national soul" (p. 243).

One of the more vehement assertions of white supremacy over the Japanese came from Walter Macarthur (1909), editor of the *Coast Seamen's Journal* in San Francisco. While Macarthur's role as a labor leader in California would suggest a rationale built on labor concerns, he argued that "the opposition to Oriental immigration is justified upon the single ground of race" and that "the race

difference between these peoples is radical and irreconcilable, because . . . it is not a matter of tongue, of color, or of anatomy . . . but of morality and intellect" (p. 239).

Macarthur cast his racist argument in the context of a great historical battle between Asians and Europeans beginning 500 years before Christ on the battle fields of Marathon and Thermopylae. He traced 2,400 years of conflict to the great battle facing California, where again Christian Europeans must take a stand against Asians (1909, p. 240)

The underlying contention repeated by many was that there would never be peaceful coexistence of the races because of fundamental differences in their natures. Macarthur quotes U.S. Senator Perkins' definition of this distinction: "Personal freedom, the home, education, Christian ideals, respect for law and order are found on one side, and on the other the traffic in human flesh, domestic life which renders a home impossible, a desire for only that knowledge which may be at once coined into dollars, a contempt for our religion as new, novel and without substantial basis, and no idea of the meaning of law other than a regulation to be evaded by cunning or by bribery" (1909, p. 241).

Macarthur was especially convinced of Japanese inferiority by the fact that "not more than one percent of the Japanese have embraced Christianity." He claimed additionally that the Japanese language contains no word synonymous with "sin" or "home" "presumably because the Japanese have no conception of either."

Like many others Macarthur concluded that "exclusion is the only alternative of race degeneracy or race war" (1909, pp. 241, 243, 246). Senator Frances Newlands (1909) also argued, in a letter to the Nevada legislature in February of 1909, that the immigration of non-whites will ultimately lead to race war under any circumstances. Therefore non-white immigration should be banned (pp. 269-271).

What irritated many Californians perhaps more than anything was the unwillingness of the Japanese to agree to any kind of inferior status. Writing in 1913, W.V. Woehlke asserted that the Chinese were discriminated against, abused, and eventually banned due to a perception that they were satisfied to remain a permanently poor underclass—depressing wages and living conditions in California. The Japanese were different because they generally demanded the same wages as whites and aspired to higher standards of living. In the minds of white Californians this should have made them at least superior to the Chinese if not perfectly acceptable.

Why, then was the peaceful, energetic Japanese hated in California? Woehlke believed it was because the Japanese was the first immigrant population that did not humble itself before the superiority of the American race and sever its old cultural ties in order to join it. He wrote that "the Japanese is the first immigrant who has not only failed to pay homage at the shrine of American nativity, but who has also challenged the right of the Caucasian to march at the head of the

procession" (1913, p. 65). Moreover, Californians were highly angered by the tendency of the Japanese government to respond angrily to any affronting of its nationals in the United States. Other nations of the world made no similar kinds of protests (Woehlke, 1913, p. 65).

Protests, however, were not heard only from the outside. A number of Americans fought the current of exclusion, arguing in the national media that for a variety of reasons the efforts to drive off the Japanese simply did not make sense.

One writer in *The Nation* magazine pondered the question of why the Japanese faced such strong opposition, when Mexican immigrants came in well over ten times the number of Japanese to fill cheap labor in California and Texas. The author quoted a Bureau of Labor statement which said that "Organized labor, and white workers in general, do not appear to be opposed to Mexicans in the same way they are to Orientals" (*The Nation,* 21 January 1909, p. 54). He concluded that Californians fear the Japanese more than the Mexicans, not because they find them more savage than the Mexicans, but rather for the opposite reason; that the Japanese worker too quickly demanded rights and opportunities and gained the skills to command them.

The conflict in California had erupted into a national issue since the Japanese government pressed the United States government from the very beginning to force California to accommodate the Japanese with equality. The local action of school segregation raised the issue, then, to the level of international relations. By the end of World War I, with nationalism and xenophobia growing ever stronger, the American people through their congressmen consented to the position taken by California and gave themselves over to exclusion (Hosokawa, 1969, pp. 99-113).

Theodore Roosevelt, who at first seemed to stand firmly on the side of the Japanese in California, by the end of his administration had also begun to turn toward exclusion as the preferred solution. In December of 1906 he had firmly denounced anti-Japanese sentiment and called for fair treatment for all immigrants. By February 1907 he had begun to turn his back on them by mildly accepting a challenge from the mayor of San Francisco. By the middle of that year he issued an executive order halting Japanese immigration through Hawaii, Mexico and Canada (*The Nation*, 21 February 1907, p.168). The "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907 pressured Japan into halting the issue of passports to skilled and unskilled laborers. Finally, in 1924 the federal government accommodated desires for exclusion of all Asian immigration (Hosokawa, 1969, pp. 91-93).

At no point could the opponents of the Japanese immigrants demonstrate any real or practical threat to their security and standard of living. But repeated efforts to depict the Japanese immigrant as incapable of assimilation, and a positive threat to racial purity and cultural stability had transformed a supposed threat in the minds of many into a real one. To the nativists great fortune they ultimately addressed an audience in America that accepted a rationale built simply on the grounds of race hatred. To the great misfortune of the Issei who remained, and their children who

gained American citizenship by birth, the racism that marked the turn of the century, buttressed by local, state, and finally federal laws bred continued discrimination. The indignities that Japanese-Americans suffered throughout the 1920s and 30s—which culminated in the shameful imprisonment of 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry in 1942—were driven by a successful campaign for racial discrimination. While these attitudes were felt more profoundly in regions where greater settlement bred contempt, white Americans were able to bring their attitudes to a national audience that accepted passively, and at times actively, race hatred.

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The Jewish Factor in Relations between the United States and Japan [1]

Naoki Maruyama
Meiji Gakuin University

Relations between the United States and Japan have occasionally been hurt by a lack of mutual understanding. As long as their mutual relations remain friendly, those of people to people are also stable and favorable. However, when tensions arise in the relationship at the governmental level, the mutual perceptions toward each other change for worse. Frequent appearance of anti-Semitic literature at Tokyo book stores explains the unstable relations in the 1930s and again in the late 1980s. These books depict Jews as the dominant force in the United States. According to these authors, America is a Jewish nation, where Jews are thought to control politics, the media and business.

It is clear that these views are based on the old anti-Semitic myth and do not represent those of the majority. What is more, most of the Japanese people have probably never met a Jew. However, the frequent appearance of such false stereotypes which increasingly infiltrate into Japanese mind, causes bitter Jewish feelings in the United States. Unless some constructive steps are taken to prevent the spread of such images, the people-to-people relations in two countries will no doubt be damaged.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze historically the mutual views of Japanese and Jewish Americans toward each other in the context of US-Japan relations.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) broke out at one of the friendly periods in the history of US-Japan relations. American President Theodore Roosevelt mediated between Japan and Russia in bringing peace to the conflict.

The War was also the beginning of Jewish-Japanese relations. It was said that around 30,000 Jewish soldiers in the Russian army fought the Japanese (Editorial Notes, 1905). Some of them surrendered to the Japanese and spent time as prisoners-of-war in Japan's internment camps. Joseph Trumpeldor, Jewish legendary hero was taken prisoner at Port Arthur and stayed nine months in

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Japan. The Japanese treatment of these Jewish POWs was said to be good. The Japanese separated the Jews from their Christian fellow soldiers in the camps, permitted them to observe their religion, to set up schools for their co-religionists, and allowed the Jewish communities in Japan to supply the POWs with religious needs.

It is well known that Japan's victory against Russia had a strong impact on the nationalist aspirations in the Arab world, Turkey and Persia. Similarly Japan's naval victory at Tsushima Straits encouraged many Jews and Zionists who desired to see the downfall of Czarism.

Chaim Weizmann, later first president of Israel, recalls the experience of meeting a Japanese student in 1905 at the laboratory of Manchester University:

> He took me for a Russian, and was, of course, very careful to allude neither to the war nor its causes . . .. In actual fact that we were both rejoicing in the progress of events—but for different reasons . . .. When the news of the battle of Psuschima (Tsushima), in which the Russian armada was completely annihilated, was reported, we sat at opposite ends of the laboratory, each eagerly devouring the special edition of the evening papers . . .. After he had finished reading, he came over and silently pressed my hand in condolence. I was fully aware of the misunderstanding, but my English was not equal to an explanation. I accepted his sympathy in silence and went on with my work. (Weizmann, 1949, pp. 102-103)

In the fall of 1904 Naphtali Herz Imber, Hebrew poet and author of the Zionist and later Israeli national anthem *Hatikva*, published a book of poems in New York called *Barkai Third*, or The Blood Avenger, which he dedicated to "His Majesty the Mikado Mutsuhito, Ruler of Japan" (Shillony, 1991, p. 145). In it he wrote Hebrew poems praising Japan's victories in the Russo–Japanese War.

Meanwhile, Jewish American banker Jacob H. Schiff helped Japan's floating of war bonds in overseas markets. According to Schiff (1906), the Russo–Japanese War was the struggle between the Northern Goliath and the Far–Eastern David. He did not conceal his hatred of Russia for its persecution of the Jews. On the eve of the war, Schiff, president of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, expressed his belief that Russia would be beaten and humiliated and that the result of such a war would be the breakup of the Russian autocracy (Schiff, 1906). After the War, Schiff was awarded the Second Treasure and the Order of the Rising Sun by the Japanese Government for his contribution to Japan's victory. In March 1906 when Schiff paid a visit to Japan, the Japanese Government warmly welcomed him. Emperor Meiji hosted a luncheon on behalf of Schiff and his party. The Japan Bank thanked Schiff on his contribution to the war at the garden party in Tokyo. In these occasions Japan's political, military and business leaders joined and praised his valuable assistance.

Schiff continued to lend a helping hand to Japan. In 1907 when the Japan Society was established in New York, Schiff was one of the founding members. Thereafter he extended help in propagating a favorable image of Japan in the United States. However, this did not last long. When World War I broke out and Japan entered the war on the side of Russia against Germany, Schiff, who was born in Germany, was disappointed by Japan's stance and resigned from the Japan Society (Madison, 1970, p. 70).[2]

TURNING POINT

After the Russo-Japanese War the US-Japan relations were incessantly disturbed by unpleasant incidents. Japan's growing territorial ambition in Manchuria was challenged by the US Government which was unwilling to recognize Japan's predominant position in Southern Manchuria. Further American anti-Japanese sentiment was augmented by the passage of an exclusion bill of Japanese school children in California in 1906.

Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution of 1917 had been a great shock to the Japanese people. The collapse of the Romanov dynasty was seen by the Japanese as a grave threat to their Imperial family. The so-called "red peril" theory alarmed the Japanese public. Japanese military officers who were sent to Siberia in order to intervene in the revolution, met many White Russian refugees fleeing from the revolution. These refugees hated the Jews because they believed that the revolution was caused by a Jewish conspiracy. Volumes of anti-Semitic literature including *The Protocols of Elders of Zion*, were brought back into Japan by those who made contact with the White Russians in Siberia.

Therefore, false stories about "Jewish peril" and "Jewish conspiracy" easily spread among the Japanese officials dispatched to Siberia. Several leading Jewish experts appeared from among those officials. Although most anti-Semitic publications were translated from Russian sources and did not cause a stir among the general public in Japan, the Japanese authorities became more cautious of the seemingly increased Jewish influence.

In the 1930s another anti-Semitic literature came into Japan this time from Germany. The Nazi advent to power provided a new impetus to those who advocated "Jewish peril" stories in Japan. In February of 1936 they established Kokusai Seikei Gakkai (International Political-Economic Association) in Tokyo to do research on the "Jewish question." From November of 1936 they started to publish its organ, *Study on International Secret Power*, and from 1941, the monthly *Jewish Studies* (Maruyama, 1987-1988). Thus Kokusai Seikei Gakkai played a leading role in

[2] In November 1916, Schiff decided to return to the Japan Society and was elected a life member.

organizing and mobilizing anti-Semitic public opinion among the Japanese over a long period of time.

Beginning with the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, followed by the establishment of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932, Japan's position in the international community sharply deteriorated, leading to her isolation and finally to her withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933.

THE FAR EASTERN JEWISH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Manchurian economy had not recovered from the Great Depression. Further, the mounting conflict between Japan and China erupted into large-scale war in July 1937. As the war escalated, the shortage of capital and materials was recognized by the Japanese in Manchuria as critical for the economic development of Manchukuo. In the Japanese military establishment there were the officers represented by General Itagaki Seishiro, a high ranking staff officer attached to the Kwantung Army, who enthusiastically advocated the idea of importing American capital in order to develop Manchuria. At the same time there were the strong voices in favor of the idea in the Japanese business community. Ayukawa Yoshisuke, president of the Nissan Company, shared the view of importing American capital with Itagaki. Ayukawa took office as president of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Development Corporation which was set up in December of 1937 in order to revitalize the Manchurian economy. Furthermore, the Japanese authorities in Manchuria recognized that the presence of the Soviet forces close to the Manchurian borders posed a serious threat to Manchukuo. Thus the Japanese, especially the Kwantung Army, needed to mend relations with the United States to reduce tension in US-Japan relations.

On the other hand, the Jewish community in Harbin with its Jewish population of 5,000, made an attempt to integrate all the Jewish communities in the Far East under its guidance. Abraham Kaufman, president of the Harbin Jewish Community approached the Japanese military authorities asking for the permission to hold a conference. The Japanese Special Agency in Harbin favored the idea and allowed them to organize the conference. The Japanese shared their anti-Communist stance with these Jews and also considered to exploit Jewish influence for Japan's own purposes.

In December 1937 the Far Eastern Jewish National Conference was held in Harbin which was supported by the Kwantung Army and Manchukuo. Most of the Jewish communities in the Far East sent their delegations to the Conference. About 600 Jews living in Harbin also attended the Conference. General Higuchi Kiichiro, chief of the Special Agency in Harbin attended the conference as a guest and made a speech stressing that there was no discrimination against Jews in

Japan and Manchukuo. After the Conference the German Embassy in Tokyo made a protest asking for the explanation to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which was forwarded to the War Ministry. Subsequently Tojo Hideki, chief-of-staff of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria ignored Tokyo's inquiry. On January 25, 1938 Tojo asked Hoshino Naoki, Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Manchukuo Government to conduct the Jewish policy on the following principles: to encourage Far Eastern Jews to be more dependent upon Japan and Manchukuo; to explain the spirits of *minzoku kyowa* (racial harmony) and *happo ichiu* (the whole world under one roof) to Germany (Tojo, 1938).

The purpose of the Conference was to publicize Japan's good treatment of the Jews under her control. This publicity was aimed especially towards the United States. Those Japanese who had made desperate efforts to save the Manchurian economic situation seemed to be obsessed by the Jewish conspiracy theory: Wall Street was in the hands of Jewish capital and the American mass media were controlled by the Jewish Americans. Therefore, in their eyes, the Far Eastern Jewish National Conferences which were held further in 1938 and 1939, were designed to contribute toward these objectives: attraction of American Jewish capital into Manchuria and improvement of Japan's image in the United States. Japan's Foreign Ministry dispatched telegrams to its overseas delegations requesting them to report their host countries' reactions to the Conference.

However, when it became clear that the results of the Conference were not as highly publicized as the Japanese expected, they were disappointed. The indifference of the American Jewish communities especially embarrassed the Japanese. Although the Jewish Americans were in sympathy with those Jews who were, to some extent, well treated by the Japanese, as loyal citizens of the United States, they could not voice their support of the appeal made by the Far Eastern Jews, which would lead to the support of Japan's puppet state, Manchukuo. In early 1940 there were some Japanese unofficial attempts to establish contact with the American Jewish communities in order to mend relations with the United States. However, these attempts ended in failure. Even if the Jewish Americans had expressed gratitude for Japan's generosity, it would not have changed the course of Japan's foreign policy. Tamura Kozo, a Japanese who voluntarily endeavored in order to improve deteriorating US-Japan relations with the help of Jewish Americans, visited the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in New York and met B. Kahn in November 1940. Tamura emphasized that the Jews of the United States could help and create friendly relations between the US and Japan. However, Kahn wrote the record of the meeting in his memorandum submitted to the AJJDC:

> If some practical steps could be taken by the Japanese government in favor of the Jews, the Jews in America and in the world would be very grateful to the Japanese government and would express their gratitude in appropriate form, but as far as any political action, I did not think the Jews of America would act as Jews. Only in the religious field would they act as Jews first, in any other endeavor they are first Americans, then Jews. (Kahn, 1940)

JEWISH REFUGEES IN THE FAR EAST

After the establishment of the Third Reich, Jewish refugees from Central Europe began to arrive at the Far East. It caused embarrassment for the Japanese.

As most of the Western nations closed the doors to the Jewish refugees, Jews made desperate attempts to look for havens. Finally they found Shanghai as the sole refuge where no visa was required because of the extraterritoriality of the International Settlement in Shanghai. Since 1933 when the first Jewish refugees came to Shanghai from Germany, refugees had begun to reach there. Between March, 1938 and September, 1939 about 110,000 Austrians and Germans were able to emigrate and some of them regarded Shanghai as an attractive haven (Mars, 1969).

In April 1938 Japan's Foreign Ministry took the matter up with the War and Navy Ministries and established the Committee of Muslim and Jewish Affairs in order to consider Japan's basic policy on Muslims and Jews, and to cope with the matters connected with these peoples. Meanwhile, Jewish refugees continued to escape from Germany and Austria. Jews came to the Japanese embassies in these countries and asked for transit visas to Japan. Although there was the Treaty of the Exemption of Visas between Japan and Germany, these embassies worried about the increase in the number of Jewish visitors. Moreover, the Japanese Government was unwilling to allow these refugees to Japan and Japanese controlled areas in China.

In such a circumstance the Government adopted Japan's Policy Outline on the Jewish Affairs on December 6, 1938. It was a very unique stance in view of Japan's international position. In its preamble it said that Japan would keep her friendly relations with Germany and Italy on the one hand, but on the other hand she would need foreign capital for economic development and should avoid worsening relations with the United States. The specific policies were stated as follows:

- Jews living in Japan, Manchukuo, and China are treated fairly and in the same manner as other foreign nationals. No special effort to expel them is to be made.
- Jews entering Japan, Manchukuo, and China are to be dealt with on the basis of existing immigration policies pertaining to other foreigners.
- No special effort to attract Jews to Japan, Manchukuo, or China is to be made. However, exceptions may be made for businessmen and technicians with utility value for Japan (Sakamoto, 1998).

On the other hand, the influx of Jewish refugees into the International Settlement posed a serious threat to the people who had already settled there. Shanghai Municipal Council, executive organ of the International Settlement issued its decree that after August 16, 1939 no more Jewish refugees were permitted to enter Shanghai.

In Japan the pro-German groups gained the upper hand over the pro Anglo-American groups. Finally on September 27, 1940 Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. This eliminated all attempts to improve Japan's relations with the United States.

Increasing German influence put more pressure on Japan's negative stance towards the "Jewish problem." The Fourth Far Eastern Jewish National Conference which was to be held at Dairen in December of 1940, was suddenly canceled by the Japanese. One of the organizers recalls: "We completed all the preparations for the conference, sending the letters of invitation to all Jewish communities in East Asia and making arrangements for hotels. However, a week before the conference, we were ordered to cancel the conference" (T. Kaufman, personal communication, December 10, 1981).

For the Japanese officials, the "Jewish card" was no longer needed. Nevertheless, the Jewish communities of East Asia were different from those of Europe. They were free from anti-Semitic violence. With the increasing German influence in Japan, anti-Semitic literature was brought into Japan. However, this was limited in a world of imagination. Japan-Germany relations were often disturbed by Germany's pro-China policy and the Russian spy Sorge case which led to increasing distrust among the Japanese officials.[3] There were almost no recorded incidents that were inspired by those anti-Semitic stories in Japan even after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The Polish Jews who took refuge in Kobe were warmly treated by the local people (Shatzkes, 1991). Furthermore, after reviewing the Japanese treatment of these Jewish refugees, American Vice Consul in Kobe reported in May 1941, that despite Japan's close political relations with Germany, there were no cases reported of discrimination against Jewish refugees (Melbourne, 1941).

THE WAR, JEWS AND JAPANESE

Although the outbreak of the war in the Pacific surprised the Jewish communities in East Asia, world Jewry worried about their brethren in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied territories in Eastern Europe. Just prior to Pearl Harbor, Topaz, President of the Shanghai Ashkenazi Jewish Communal Association (SAJCA) sent a telegram to the Zionist Organization of America. The telegram said that on this day when the fate of the Pacific was in balance, Topaz was expressing the opinion of a large community when he explained that although Japan was allied to the Axis countries it was necessary to emphasize that Japan and its people were against national hatred and oppression. War in the Pacific was going to bring untold hardships to millions of people and in the interest of humanity the

[3] Richard Sorge, a German journalist who worked for COMINTERN (Communist International) established close relationships with Japanese government officials and the German Ambassador to Tokyo. However, in October 1941 Sorge was arrested then executed in November 1944.

SAJCA hoped a peaceful mutual understanding could be reached (Topaz, 1941). American Jewry, however, did not lend their ears to this appeal.

With the start of the War and the break in communication between East Asia and the United States, the Jewish communities in East Asia were cut off from the rest of the world. Moreover, in May 1943 the Jewish refugees in Shanghai where the Japanese forces occupied, were coercively transferred to the special restricted area in Hongkew which was designated as an internment camp. About 14,000 refugees either already resided in, or had relocated to the "designated area" (Kranzler, 1976, p. 502). The designated area was, however, different from the Nazi concentration camps. There were no barbed wire entanglements in the area, where the internees were permitted to go out and continue their works outside if they obtained special passes. It is estimated that approximately 17,000 Jews reached Shanghai in 1939 and their number exceeded 20,000 by the end of 1941 (Mars, 1969). On the other hand, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC), which was founded in 1914 as a Jewish rescue organization of overseas refugees, sent its representative, Laura Margolis who was later joined by another representative, Manuel Siegel, coped with daily difficulties in the Jewish communities in Shanghai, since the AJJDC had to stop sending money to China after the outbreak of the war (L. Margolis Jarblum, personal communication, January 6, 1982 and December 13, 1988). Nevertheless, they managed to provide a daily meal for over eight thousand refugees (Kenvin, 1986).[4] Early in 1943 they were arrested as enemy aliens and sent to Japanese detention camps in Shanghai. Although Siegel remained in the camp until after the liberation of Shanghai, Margolis was released in September 1943, as part of a prisoner-of-war exchange (L. Margolis Jarblum, personal communication, January 6, 1982 and December 13, 1988).

THE POST-WAR TRENDS

Japan seems to be indirectly responsible for Nazi Germany's murder of six million Jews because of her alliance with the latter in the 1940s. After the war, however, anti-Semitic literature almost disappeared. It is said that *The Diary of Anne Frank* which was first published in 1952 has sold four million copies in Japan. The Anne Frank Museum in Amsterdam is one of the most popular tourist spots for young Japanese girls.

US-Japan relations have been not always good in the post-war periods. For example, Japan's policy towards the Middle East, especially her adoption of pro-Arab stance in the context of the oil crisis following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War irritated the US Government as well as American Jewish communities. Japan's new policy stance which emphasized "The Government of Japan will continue

[4] For a review of AJJDC activities, See Bauer (1974), Bauer (1981), and Zertal (1984).

to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to reconsider its policy towards Israel," stood in sharp contrast to her former attitude in which Japan's decisions on international problems were traditionally in conformity with those of the United States in the post-war periods. It was clear that the breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel would deteriorate Japan's relations with the United States. Despite this, Japanese compassion for the Jewish victims of the Holocaust has never suffered a setback.

However, anti-Semitism has revived with the growing friction in US-Japan economic relations in the 1980s. As the *New York Times* pointed out in March 1987, large numbers of anti-Semitic books appeared in Japan, which carried classic "Jewish conspiracy stories" in their new interpretations: "Jewish-dominated interests have begun a targeted bashing of Japan, engineering the recent surge in the yen's value against the dollar. . ." (Haberman, 1987). Such reports shocked and outraged many Jewish and other Americans. An editorial of a local newspaper in Chicago called for "a full boycott of all Japanese products" ("Boycott Japanese products now," 1988). Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA) and Representative Charles Schumer (D-NY) made a protest to Japanese Ambassador against recent manifestations of Japanese anti-Semitism (Harris, 1987).

Particularly interesting is that such anti-Semitic rhetoric conceals anti-American sentiment. Also, the influx of Japanese manufactured goods into the American market alarms many Americans, who are more inclined to believe that Japan is a unique nation whose standards are remarkably different from theirs. Naturally in the course of ethnocentric and xenophobic denunciations, the views these two peoples have of each other will further deteriorate, unless effective steps are taken.

It is symbolic from the standpoint of strengthening mutual understanding between Japanese and Jews that in July 1995 a museum opened in Western Japan. The Holocaust Education Center aims to educate the Japanese on the Holocaust and also starts to send an important message to the world from a small town in Hiroshima Prefecture where another holocaust was caused by the atomic bomb.

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Mahikari Beyond Japan

W. Sanborn Pfeiffer
Southern Polytechnic State University

Sukyo Mahikari is an intriguing part of Japan's so-called "new" religious movement, both because of its belief system and also because of its expansion into non-Japanese cultures. In many ways it typifies the way that Japanese culture has borrowed features of other cultures, fashioned them into something uniquely Japanese, and then exported them to the world outside Japan. Thus Mahikari becomes an interesting topic to consider including in a general course on Asian or Japanese culture, especially any course that covers the fascinating continuum of traditional and non-traditional religious movements.

After a general overview of the sect, this article will focus on a few features that have led to Mahikari's growth outside Japan (especially in the West)—namely, the hope of a cure for illnesses, the desire to be among those who survive the apocalypse, and a perceived accommodation of diverse religious beliefs. These features, together with what its most well-known ex-member calls "an attractive Eastern-type" tone (G. Greenwood, personal communication, Nov. 3, 1998), account in part for Mahikari's popularity outside Japan.

New religions have so taken root in Japan that they're now considered a common part of the religious landscape. Depending on what source you read or what definition you accept, they began either in the early 1800s, the Meiji period, the early 1900's, or after World War II. Many experts seem to agree on early Meiji (Inoue, 1991). Whereas some consider new religions a sign of Japan's transition from a religious to a secular world view, others view them as "modern versions of Japan's spirituality" (McVeigh, 1997, p. 24). Most new religions combine features of traditional faiths—such as Buddhism, Shinto, folk religions, and Christianity—to form a unique combination of credos, customs, and ceremonies. Often they have a charismatic leader who is revered as a spokesman for, or intermediary with, a supreme being. Other features may include emphasis on the power of the mind, karmic influence from past lives, a coming paradise on earth located in Japan, close-knit groups, healing, magical practices, and variations on the theme of environmentalism (McVeigh, 1997). As one critic writes, the new religious movements "offer something unavailable in older religion. Basically, they offer a surer, shorter, swifter, or clearer way to salvation" (Wilson, 1979, p. 196). The subset of new religions sometimes called "new" new religions, of which Mahikari is one, had their major growth in the 1970s and 1980s, place more emphasis on psychic and

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spiritualistic phenomena, appeal more to younger members, and use the media more intensively than their predecessors (Inoue, 1991).

Okada Yoshikazu officially began the Mahikari sect in August 1960, about a year and a half after what he claimed was his first religious revelation from God, who told Okada to "Give the true light of god and declare the dawn of the spiritual civilization" (McVeigh, 1997, p. 15). These revelations were collected in the Mahikari holy book, Goseigen, and the sect grew steadily until Okada died in 1974. At that point a leadership dispute arose, after which the organization divided into two main factions: Sukyo Mahikari, still run today by Okada's adopted daughter, and Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyodan. Most of my information comes from sources associated with the larger group, Sukyo Mahikari, though the two sects are quite similar in their doctrine.

Whatever faction they belong to, Mahikari adherents believe that each member has the power to direct light, which has come from their god, first through a holy amulet (*omitama*) worn around their necks, and then through their palm toward people or objects that need repair. As one early chronicler of Mahikari put it, "members claim to be able to heal all kinds of diseases, repair broken appliances, improve the taste of food, open the eyes of the dead . . . resurrect dead goldfish—all by raising their hands" (Davis, 1980, p. 11). Such giving of light may also remove "bad karma" accumulated from one's past lives and the past lives of others. Mahikari literature sometimes shows those who have received light writhing on the floor and performing Samurai-like martial motions, during which time the spirits are being "healed" (as opposed to being removed or "exorcised"). This directing of light represents Mahikari's most distinctive feature, though it is worth noting that some earlier new religions also included this characteristic.

Of Japan's 350 or more new religions, most are limited to Japan and thus "have not yet been exported to the West" (Melton & Jones, 1994, p. 36). Of the few that have succeeded outside Japan, Sukyo Mahikari has attracted the largest number besides Soka Gakkai (Inoue, 1991). One recent estimate places active membership at 100,000 to 200,000, with the 1990 *Dictionary of New Religions* citing Mahikari's own membership claim of over 367,000 (McVeigh, 1997). Accurate numbers for overseas membership are hard to come by. Garry Greenwood, a prominent ex-member, gave me the following estimates of active adherents (the number of people originally initiated would be higher): Australia—2,000; North America—2,000; Europe—5,000-10,000; and Southeast Asia (outside Japan)—5,000 (personal communication, Nov. 3, 1998).

Mahikari's first official mission beyond Japan was in France in 1971, with the offering of an elementary training course. The sect's leader, Okada Yoshikazu, visited Europe two years later in 1973 and was able to secure an audience with the Pope. This encounter, as well as purported words of encouragement from the Pope, have become part of Mahikari lore and an element in the Mahikari recruitment strategy abroad. The main mission in Europe, by the way, was the purification by light

of the city of Amsterdam, with help from Mahikari groups in Italy and Belgium (Cornille, 1991). Later, in 1984, the sect established a presence in Great Britain as well (Somers, 1994).

According to one survey, most European Mahikari members are about 40-50 years old (a younger membership than that of Japan), about 60% female, and from the lower middle class in general. The sect maintains loyalty this far from Japan by making sure that most centers are run by Japanese, who are rotated to another center every two years. Indeed, Mahikari appears to have learned from the experience of some other new religions, whose international missions sometimes splintered from the main office (Cornille, 1991).

After its initial success in Europe, Mahikari went on to start centers in Australia, the United States, and Central and South America. As of 1990, the international division of Sukyo Mahikari had oversight over five main geographical areas: (1) Europe, (2) North America, (3) South America, (4) Australia, and (5) Hong Kong and Taiwan (McVeigh, 1997). The most recent information I have lists the following locations of main offices outside of Japan: Ansembourg, Belgium; Sao Paulo, Brazil; Dickson, Australia; Rancho Mirage, California; and Singapore (Sukyo Mahikari pamphlet, n.d.).

Now, just what attracts tens of thousands of adherents around the world to this new religion that started in Japan in 1960? It appears that the most compelling attraction of Mahikari is its promise of healing. One ex-member—who maintains a web site mainly for people who want to leave Mahikari or similar religious groups—said that she and her husband came to Sukyo Mahikari for healing, too. Interestingly, although she left the sect because of what she characterized as its extreme control over adherents, she still believes in the core healing provide by the application of "light." Put another way, the manipulation of the energy field around the body is effective in dealing with disease (J. Logan, personal communication, Nov. 16, 1998). According to another source, over half of Mahikari members join because of the desire to eliminate illness or pain (Davis, 1980).

Mahikari offers easy access to the healing power of light by encouraging non-members first entering a center to "take light"—that is, to receive the light directed from the palm of a member. (One can only "give light" after attending the primary training and receiving the *omitama*, or amulet.) Indeed, when I visited the Atlanta Mahikari center to interview the *doshi*, I was asked several times if I wished to "receive light." Thus one can imagine that sick people in many cultures, when facing an illness that doesn't seem to respond to traditional treatment, might be inclined to seek alternative care by visiting a Mahikari center; they need not accept any ideology or sign any papers to get treatment with the "divine light." Potential converts are encouraged to "try it" first—"it" being the healing light—without having to hear any specific dogma at this initial point (Reader, 1991). As one writer puts it, "Many a member in the West turns to Mahikari as a last resort after all other medical and paramedical means have failed" (Cornille, 1994, p. 92). After

treatment—assuming some relief is achieved—the "patient" then may be ready to become more involved in Mahikari teachings.

Mahikari further eliminates obstacles to membership by suggesting that those seeking treatment receive light in addition to their conventional treatment, a strategy that lessens resistance from potential members unfamiliar with healing by light. One sheet I received upon entering the Atlanta center suggested that the visitor is encouraged to "continue receiving traditional medical treatment while taking light at the Mahikari center" (Sukyo Mahikari "Welcome!" sheet, n.d.). Thus my own experience reinforces a conversation included in the first book-length study of Mahikari. A Mahikari trainer was asked the following: "Western medicine tells us that sickness is caused by bacteria and viruses . . . Is this wrong?" to which the trainer replied, "It isn't wrong. It's just not a complete explanation" (Davis, 1980, 37-38).

Another attraction for some Westerners is Mahikari's apocalyptic cosmology and the resulting sense of "being chosen" when one joins the sect. As ex-member Jean Logan wrote me, "Mahikari study classes and writings in the Goseigen convince the members that they are 'chosen people' called 'seed people.'" Only the seed people will survive the coming annihilation of mankind and make it into the subsequent "spiritual age." Logan claimed that "the apocalyptic vision lends a certain degree of excitement, and reinforces the 'specialness' of members as chosen people." Then, as members are further brought into the mysteries of Mahikari, they are instilled with a sense of fear and guilt. She further wrote that:

> Mahikari tries to hold members by discouraging them from reading anything outside of Mahikari teachings and magazines. It convinces them that people who leave are "spiritually disturbed." When people leave, members then break off friendships. Mahikari uses talk of "evil spirits" in the same way that traditional churches use the devil or satan to control people (personal communication, Nov. 16, 1998).

Thus, according to one former convert, the messianic mission that helps draw potential converts into Mahikari becomes mixed with a fear that leaving the sect might lead to loneliness on earth and damnation in the hereafter.

Jean Logan also suggested that Mahikari had especially good results attracting members into the "chosen" few among those who have psychological problems. She noted that "Mahikari unfortunately draws into its numbers a certain number of people who are unstable. Temporarily, the love and spiritual energy gives them peace of mind . . . This [peace of mind] may leave, however, when the fear and guilt takes its toll" (personal communication, Nov. 16, 1998). Thus Western Mahikari members, both unstable and otherwise, may join both to heal their bodies and to have the opportunity to be among those who survive the end of the world as we know it.

The fact that such comments about the motivations of current members are made by someone who left the organization certainly needs to be considered. Yet Mahikari literature itself supports the view that the religion attracts those who want to escape the rapidly approaching "baptism of fire," as the following two excerpts show: "The Creator God sent Kotama Okada [the founder] into the world in this confused age as humankind's last chance to receive salvation," and "He [Kotama Okada] explained that according to his covenant with God, 'seed-people,' the people who will build a new civilization in the twenty-first century, must be nurtured" (Sukyo Mahikari pamphlet, n.d., pp. 4-5; 18-19).

The exact date of the millennial event predicted by Mahikari remains unclear, perhaps for good reason. An Australian journalist, who has followed both Aum and Mahikari, wrote me that "I have a rare old 80ish SM [Sukyo Mahikari] booklet that actually dates the baptism of fire's great convulsions as before the year 2000. It is the only time I see a specific, measurable time frame" (L. Betti, personal communication, Sept. 7, 1998). Yet there are certainly intimations of apocalypse, for example on a website for the other major branch of Mahikari besides Sukyo (i.e., Sekai). An announcement there claimed that "On August 19, 1999, 10 planets of the solar system will form a cross. The Grand Cross suggests the end of material-primary civilization" (Sekai Web site, 1998). People were encouraged to gather at a particular location for what the announcement calls somewhat vaguely a "big attuning." It's not clear exactly what was supposed to happen, and perhaps promoters of the event had good reason not to be too specific about suggesting a premature end of the world. As Stephen Jay Gould says in his book on millennial movements, "nothing dulls enthusiasm quite so effectively as the spectacular failure of a central prediction" (1997, p. 49). Understandably, millennial groups often hedge their bets.[1]

Besides wanting to be healed and to be among survivors of the apocalypse, a third attraction Mahikari holds for an international audience is its non-exclusive welcoming of those of all faiths into its spiritual tent. Mahikari literature notes that "The initiation course is open to all people over ten years old, regardless of sex, nationality, race, or ideology. Those who are already believers of other faiths are not required to abandon them in order to join Mahikari" (Sukyo Mahikari pamphlet, n.d., p. 37). This accommodation of all religions serves to invite into the fold many—especially Christians—who might not otherwise join an organization requiring them to abandon their birth religion. In one survey of Belgium Mahikari members, 60 percent were Christian when they joined Mahikari and three-fourths of that number still continued to view themselves as Christian after being members of the Mahikari sect for some time (Cornille, 1994). Cornille also found that many of these

[1] Upon returning to the Sekai web site—www.mahikari.org—on October 28, 1999, I found no reference to the "big attuning" event that was to have occurred over two months before.

members tended to accept only those Mahikari beliefs that did not conflict with their Christian beliefs.

In fact, some Mahikari tenets clearly are at odds with traditional Christianity and make its relative popularity in the West all the more surprising. It is remarkably Japanocentric. First, Mahikari doctrine states that Jesus "came to Japan for religious training" (Reader, 1991, pp. 28-29), escaped crucifixion, and returned to Japan and died there at an old age. Second, Mahikari doctrine accepts a mythology that declares the superiority of the "yellow" race (among the five races—"Yellow, Red, White, Blue (or Green), and Purple (or Black)"—created by the Su-god). According to Mahikari, the mission of Japan is to reunite the five races and restore the emperor as Su-god's representative on earth (McVeigh, 1997, p. 73).

How, one might ask, does a sect with such Japanocentric beliefs gain members among non-Japanese? One answer is that nationalistic themes are seriously downplayed—or delayed—in Mahikari training outside of Japan. Mahikari adherents can receive three levels of training—primary, intermediate, and advanced. Because the three stages are stretched over a fairly long period and because Japanocentric issues are not introduced until the advanced training—which takes place in Japan—adherents are already well integrated into Mahikari before they learn of its theological focus on Japan (Somers, 1994). In early training, even the Japanese language used in prayers is given a special name, *Kotodama* (or "language of the gods"), rather than being called Japanese. Perhaps this effort to de-emphasize Japan has worked. One survey in Europe revealed that few had joined the sect because of any awe for Japan (Cornille, 1991). Interestingly, the Mahikari movement in Japan itself does have a problem in this regard. The special attention given Japan and things Japanese has driven Westerners in Japan, who belong to the sect, to form a subgroup because of their feelings of alienation (Cornille, 1991).

Mahikari's seeming accommodation of other religions notwithstanding, there's more going on here than just interfaith good will. Mahikari considers itself to be a "Supra-religion" and its god, Su-god, to be a "supra-god" who is in a sense the father of all other gods. Indeed, Mahikari doctrine states that after apocalypse members of what it considers the five great religions—Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, and Taoism—will "return to their spiritual origins [the Mahikari main shrine in Takayama] and reunite under the banner of Mahikari" (McVeigh, 1997, p. 37). Thus it becomes more clear why Mahikari wants to attract people of all faiths to the initial training programs. Many such converts, who often have found their own religions lacking, are ready to join a group that makes few demands, at least initially, and that offers instant solutions to medical and other problems with its "divine light."

Beyond the three main features already discussed—the promise of healing, the hope of being among the chosen "seed people," and the accommodation of many faiths—there are secondary

reasons why Mahikari achieves success outside Japan. For example, Mahikari's emphasis in organic farming—which is an extension of its campaign again pollution of all kinds, material and spiritual—attracts followers in the U.S. and elsewhere. Indeed, one ex-member with whom I talked had considered donating acreage in the United States for a Mahikari spiritual center, but this person left the sect before the transfer occurred.

Finally, one must also examine Mahikari's recruitment methods to get a fuller understanding of its growth beyond Japan. Like many other new religions, Mahikari must recruit heavily to offset a high dropout rate. By one estimate, of those who complete primary training in order to give light, about 50 percent eventually leave the sect, 20 percent become active members, and 30 percent can be characterized as "lukewarm" (McVeigh, 1997, p. 18). From what I have been able to surmise, recruiting in the West occurs in much the same way that it does in Japan, with heavy emphasis on the responsibility of current members to establish networks among friends, acquaintances, and fellow workers.

One strong motivation to recruit is built into the criteria for advancement within the Mahikari organization. To become eligible for the intermediate training that follows the initial training for membership, one must recruit two members (in addition to paying a fee). Then to gain permission to attend advanced training, one must have recruited five members and have paid a fairly large sum (McVeigh, 1997). In addition to these personal recruitment efforts, both of the main Mahikari factions have web sites to reach the Internet-active population. Such sites include background text as well as graphics, such as before-and-after shots of polluted water particles that have been "treated" with divine light. One site in California goes a step further in marketing by stating that "We offer [a] seven-day trial with no obligation. We are waiting for your visit" (Sekai web site, 1998)

In summary, Mahikari's success has resulted mainly from its members' need for the following: (1) healing of diverse physical and psychological ailments, (2) escape from the coming apocalypse, and (3) a new faith that incorporates features of traditional religions that Mahikari adherents formerly practiced or indeed continue to practice. In this way Mahikari, along with many other "new" religions, plays an important role in current religion and popular culture, both inside and outside of Japan. Some coverage of this movement would fit well within any course that aims to introduce students to contemporary Japan and its global influence.

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Missionary Versus Atheist: James Curtis Hepburn and Edward Sylvester Morse as Foreign Technical Experts in Meiji Japan

Jonathan Goldstein [1]

State University of West Georgia

The Foreign Expert And Modernization in Non-western Cultures

Between 1868 and 1912, Japan's restored imperial government determined to modernize and strengthen its rule by directly hiring and also allowing into the country approximately 3,000 *yatoi*, or foreign technical experts, in fields ranging from the building of lighthouses to the writing of a new constitution. This tactic was the outgrowth of the hiring of some two hundred foreign technical experts in late Tokugawa Japan between 1854 and 1868. It was also part of a broader effort, in the words of the 1868 Imperial Charter Oath, to "abandon absurd customs of former times and seek knowledge from all over the world." [2]

The objective of this paper is to reconsider the role of two such foreign experts who participated in one aspect of Japan's modernization process, the acquisition of Western medical training and biological information. Both men taught biology. The fundamentalist Presbyterian missionary doctor James Curtis Hepburn (1815-1911) was both the founding president and professor of physiology and hygiene at Tokyo's Meiji Gakuin University. He was sponsored by American Protestants and, unlike Edward Sylvester Morse (1838-1911), was not paid by the Meiji government. The free thinking Morse was formally a *yatoi*, or hired employee of the Meiji government. He was associated with Salem, Massachusetts's Peabody Academy of Science for more than fifty years. In

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[1] Copyright Jonathan Goldstein 2000. Used here with permission. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Japan Studies Association's Annual Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 7, 2000. This article should be read in conjunction with the author's "Edward Sylvester Morse (1838-1925) as Expert and Western Observer in Meiji Japan" (Goldstein, 1987). For textual criticism, the author would like to thank Professors Steve Heine of Florida International University, Kinko Ito of the University of Arkansas, Donald McCleary of the University of Georgia, Richard Rice of the University of Tennessee, and Richard Rubinger of Indiana University. For bibliographical and technical assistance, the author is grateful to Mel Johnson of the University of Maine at Orono's Fogler Library; Charles Beard, Nancy Farmer, and Myron House of West Georgia's Ingram Library; and the entire staff of the Bangor (Maine) Theological Seminary Library. Funding for the basic research for this article was provided by West Georgia's Learning Resources Committee.

[2] The Imperial Charter Oath is reproduced in Tsunoda Ryusaku, et. al., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 644; W.G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 322-4; and Peter Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 75. On Tokugawa experts including Hepburn whose stay in Japan straddles the Tokugawa and Meiji eras, see John Z. Bowers, *When the Twain Meet* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 63 and *passim*.

the course of three trips to Japan, Morse was the founding professor of biology and foremost introducer of Darwinism at Tokyo Imperial University.

According to missionary historian Charles Iglehart, the Tokyo University campus of the 1870s and 1880s was an arena for intellectual combat for "able antagonists, some of whom wrote for and some of whom wrote against Christianity" (Iglehart, 1959, pp. 60-61; see also Griffis, 1913, pp. 224-225). In a narrow sense, this paper is a vignette of that ideological clash. In a broader sense, a reexamination of Hepburn and Morse can be considered part of a general analysis of the role of the foreign expert in the modernization process. Despite Japan's industrial prowess in the twentieth century, it was, by its own admission, a "have-not," developing nation in the 1870s and 1880s. Did Hepburn, Morse, and other foreign experts seek to teach citizens of a developing nation to "do things the way we do them?" Did they merely perform their functions—teaching, engineering, business, or diplomacy—cash their paychecks, and return home? Or did they take a more empathetic approach to foreign cultures? An analysis of the attitude and behavior of Hepburn and Morse in Japan therefore might contribute some information on how the United States should or should not relate to developing countries today, in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Thumbnail biographies of each man are presented here, followed by comparisons between their career patterns.[3]

JAMES CURTIS HEPBURN

Hepburn arrived in Japan in 1859, having matriculated in theology at Princeton (A.B. 1832) and in medicine at the University of Pennsylvania (M.D. 1836). Between 1839 and 1845 he and his wife Clarissa apprenticed as evangelists in Singapore, Amoy, and especially Macao, where they were influenced by long-term China missionaries S. Wells Williams and Peter Parker.[4] Missionary historian Evarts Greene has characterized each of the latter representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions as individuals with a "large concept" of mission (Greene, 1927, p. 95). Parker, like Hepburn an ordained Presbyterian and medical doctor, also served in 1844 as interpreter to Caleb Cushing's diplomatic mission to China. Parker subsequently became United

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[3] One question beyond the scope of this paper but worthy of further scrutiny is: What was there in Japan's cultural history that supported two such very different kinds of foreign experts? That question is explored in Marc E. Lincicome, "Knowledge and Power in Japan," in his *Principle, Praxis, and the Politics of Education Reform in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), pp.1-17.

[4] Biographical sources on Hepburn include Griffis (1911), Thomas (1959), and Clement (1932). Other pioneers of the Protestant China mission with whom the Hepburns were intimate included Robert Morrison, W. H. Medhurst, David Abeel, Walter Lowrie, and Elijah and Eliza Coleman Bridgman.

States Minister (Ambassador) to China. Williams, in addition to preaching, served as secretary to the United States Legation in China. He was even more active than Parker as a linguist, first mastering Chinese and Japanese and then serving as multilingual interpreter to United States Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (Griffis, 1911, p. 70; Latourette 1932a, 1932b).

In 1859, four years after Perry's Treaty opened Japan to American penetration, James and Clarissa Hepburn arrived in Kanagawa. While Hepburn was the first American physician to work in Japan, Western medicine was already known and practiced. Indeed, for nearly a century before Hepburn's arrival Western medicine had been competing with traditional Japanese herbal medicine, which was based on Chinese texts and materia medica. In 1774 the first Japanese-language textbook on anatomy was published, followed by texts on pharmacology, internal medicine, and surgery. All were translations from state-of-the-art German works. In 1823 the German physician Philipp von Siebold began teaching medicine on Deshima Island and later in Nagasaki proper. He was followed by the German physician Otto Mohnike (1814-87) and the Dutchman Jan van den Broek (1814-65). Between 1757 and 1827 twelve schools teaching Western medicine were established in Japan, mostly in Edo (Bowers, 1970, *passim*; Bowers, 1980, pp. 3-10).

At Kanagawa Hepburn and his wife modeled their careers on the examples of the versatile missionaries they had known in China. In several specific ways the Hepburns expanded Japanese biological knowledge and medical technique. They not only established a medical clinic but almost immediately expanded their mission to encompass western-style medical education. By 1861 Hepburn was running a medical training class for young men. He was treating fifteen to twenty patients a day mainly for opthalmological ailments, his specialty for thirteen years in the United States. By July 1861 he had performed thirty-one operations for cataracts, pterygium, entropion, and one enucleation. Hepburn's daily routine in Japan involved rising at five A.M., working until breakfast, holding family worship, going to the dispensary for three or four hours, and, after lunch, visiting housebound patients (Greene, 1927, p. 354; Griffis, 1913, pp. 210 & 215; Thomas, 1959).

In September 1861, because he was also teaching Christian doctrine in violation of the Tokugawa regime's long-standing edict against Christianity, Hepburn was forced to relocate from Kanagawa to the foreign enclave in Yokohama. There he continued to combine the practice of medicine and surgery with medical education and the dissemination of Christian doctrine. Doctors from Edo repeatedly referred complex cases to him. In March 1865 Hepburn amputated the arm of a Japanese soldier with Japanese doctors and students in attendance. This may have been the first amputation ever performed on a Japanese under Western clinical conditions. He subsequently amputated the leg of the kabuki actor Sawamura Tanosuke and installed an American prosthesis, arguably the first Western prosthesis in Japan (Bowers, 1980). In the hours when he was not treating

patients or teaching medical techniques Hepburn further broadened his mission to include political involvement and linguistic publications, including an English-Japanese dictionary in 1867.[5]

Perhaps the fullest expression of the breadth of Hepburn's career in Japan was his founding and first presidency of a major Japanese liberal arts university which included medical education in its curriculum. Meiji Gakuin traces its origins to the early 1870s, when Japanese who sought Western education began to besiege the missionaries. In Kobe, Daniel Crosby Greene and Luther Gulick found, at various times, forty to eighty Japanese men seeking to enter their schools. In Yokohama James Ballagh and Samuel R. Brown saw their tutorial sessions grow into schools attended by many samurai. In Tokyo the demand for Western knowledge induced Hepburn and four others to found Tsukiji College, the predecessor school to Meiji Gakuin University, in 1883. It quickly evolved from a mere *juku*, or cram school for a handful of students, into a broadly based liberal arts institution. Although Meiji Gakuin was founded under Presbyterian auspices, it was always more than a theological seminary. Like Harvard University in the United States, it included secular learning in its

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[5] With respect to politics, when the foreign residents of Yokohama were organized into a distinct municipality, Hepburn was chosen as one of the American representatives on the Municipal Council. He served on several of its important committees and was at one point offered the Secretaryship of the American Legation in Japan. That he chose not to accept the job was most probably because of a frenetic medical work schedule rather than any disdain for politics. With respect to his work in linguistics, Hepburn was not the first American in Japan to teach English or to publish Japanese translations of English-language texts. In 1848 the American Ranald MacDonald taught English to eager Japanese who gathered around his Nagasaki prison cell. In 1850 another American, Eugene van Reed, published an English-Japanese phase book in *katakana* script. Unlike these two entrepreneurs, S. Wells Williams was a systematic linguist who may well have been Hepburn's inspiration. While serving in China, Williams had mastered the Chinese language, publishing *Easy Lessons in Chinese in 1842* and *An English and Chinese Vocabulary in the Court Dialect* in 1844. He learned fundamental Japanese from seven shipwrecked Japanese sailors whom he, Peter Parker, and others attempted to ferry back to Japan in 1837. Based on this interaction and on additional independent study, Williams produced a rudimentary Japanese translation of the *Gospel of Matthew*.

Like Williams, Hepburn began his translation and publishing career with religious tracts. In 1863, in Yokohama, he arranged for the translation and block printing of the evangelical tract *The True Doctrine Made Plain* ("Shinri Ekichi"). In 1872, he assisted with the Japanese translation and publication of *Sanyobun* ("Three Essential Documents – The Ten Commandments, Lord's Prayer, and Apostle's Creed"). Hepburn persevered with a succession of ecclesiastical publications: a Japanese New Testament in 1880, a translation of the Book of Psalms in 1880 and of other Hebrew scriptures in 1892, and a Bible Dictionary in 1892. Hepburn's *magnum opus* is a secular work, his *English-Japanese Dictionary* with *romaji* romanization. It was first published in 1867 in Shanghai by the American Presbyterian Mission Press and has been reissued in varied editions. Each of these pioneering works, secular and religious, significantly expand the access of Japanese and Westerners to each others' knowledge (Clement, 1932, pp. 567-568; Greene, 1927, pp. 96, 144, 181; Griffis, 1900, 1911, 1913; Latourette, 1932b; Thomas, 1959, p. 121; Williams, 1842 & 1844). Extant copies of these books and of subsequent editions include Hepburn's *The New Testament in Japanese* (Yokohama: American Bible Society, 1880; British and Foreign Bible Society, 1886); *The Book of Psalms* (Yokohama: n.p., 1888); *The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments in Japanese* (Yokohama: R. Meiklejoun, 1892); and *Dictionary of the Holy Bible* (Yokohama: Kristatokyo Shorui Kaisha, 1892); Hepburn, *A Japanese and English Dictionary* (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1867), subsequent edition Tokyo: Maruya; London: Trubner, 1886.

general curriculum from its earliest days. Hepburn, over and beyond his administrative and pastoral responsibilities at Meiji Gakuin, held the professorial chair in Physiology and Hygiene. In that capacity he continued the medical teaching he had begun in Kanagawa in 1859 and which continued uninterrupted until his retirement to the United States in 1892 (Bowers, 1980; Scheiner, 1970).

Edward Sylvester Morse

Morse was born in Portland, Maine, in 1838, studied physical science at Bowdoin College and Harvard, but never matriculated. For more than fifty years he was associated in varied capacities with Salem, Massachusetts' Peabody Academy of Science, an outgrowth of America's first ethnological museum, the East India Marine Society's "Cabinet of Curiosities." In the course of three visits to Japan, Morse served as the founding professor of biology at Tokyo Imperial University (1877). As a byproduct of this obligation, he personally assumed a major, if not the exclusive, role of introducing Japan to zoology with an emphasis on conchology (the systematic study of sea shells); to anthropology and paleontology as part of his lectures on zoology; to many systematic Western biological techniques, especially microscopy and the preparation of slides; to archaeology, including the first systematic dig in Japan, at the Omori shell mounds near Shinagawa; to ethnology including the history of ceramics, textiles, fine arts, and architecture; to museology, conservation science, and library science; and, indirectly through the scholars whom he hired at the Imperial University, to modern physics and embryology (Goldstein, 1987).

A Comparison Between Hepburn, Morse, and other Foreign Experts

Wherein was Morse's career pattern similar to Hepburn's? Wherein were Morse's contributions to a developing Japan unique?

With respect to similarities, both Morse and Hepburn were not narrow specialists in their academic researches. Both men were "naturalists" in the nineteenth century sense of the term. They were generalists with broad academic outlooks. While other foreign teachers, such as the aforementioned physicians as well as Brunton, Mendenhall, Milne, and Naumann, may have been generalists by training and/or occupation in the West, the activities of those experts were more or less confined to their specialities. Morse's and Hepburn's activities both in Japan and overseas on behalf of Japan were of a far broader scope.

A second similarity between Morse and Hepburn was that both men felt that public lectures and informal teaching, in the central cities of Tokyo and Kanagawa especially, were as important as

formal lectures to exclusively student audiences. Few if any other foreign technical experts gave as many public lectures or made as concerted an effort to popularize intellectual concepts.

There seem to be two major areas wherein Morse's career pattern differs significantly from Hepburn's and wherein Morse seems to have displayed far more empathy for the Japanese people and culture than did Hepburn.

First, as evidenced by Morse's publication of *Japan Day By Day* in Japanese and English, by his 1876 letters to Boston and Salem newspapers, and by an 1878 letter to the editor of *Popular Science*, it seems clear that Morse held little racial or religious prejudice toward the Japanese. He publicly criticized "civilized" Western nations which encroached on Japan.[6] This was an unusual personal quality among *yatoi*. While *yatoi* teachers appeared to have been largely free from racial bias against the Japanese, religious bias was not uncommon, even among those who loved Japan and the Japanese. Such religious bias was expressed in epithets like "Christianity is the only religion for mankind" or "heresies such as Buddhism or Shintoism" (Naohide, 1985). Hepburn, S. Wells Williams, and their fellow missionaries E. W. Syle and Henry Wood, aggressively pursued what they saw as a "Christian attack upon Japanese moral filth and ignorance" and sought, according to missionary historian William Griffis, "the educational conquest of the country" (Griffis, 1913, pp. 224-225). Such views and statements in turn elicited strong anti-foreign feeling among some Japanese. Hepburn, as noted above, was expelled from Kanagawa to the foreign enclave of Yokohama because of his evangelistic activities. On the other hand, Morse's forceful advocacy of Darwinism and atheism set him apart from fundamentalist Christian rhetoric and endeared him to many Japanese (Naohide, 1985, *passim*).

A second way in which Morse differed from Hepburn was his denunciations of the meretriciousness of mechanical civilization. Morse loved the simple beauty of nature as reflected in early Japanese architecture and artifacts. He admired Japanese who clung to these same values in their personal lives.

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[6] Morse argued that Japanese civilization was "in many respects far ahead of ours if some of the indications of civilization are to treat each other kindly, to treat their children with unvarying kindness, to treat the animals below them with tenderness, to honor their father and mother, to be scrupulously clean in their persons, to be frugal and temperate in their habits" (Morse, 1878, p. 281). For additional behavioral lessons which Morse felt Japanese could teach Americans, see, for example, Morse, "Our Manners Are Not Good" (subtitled "The Japanese Set Us an Example of Politeness"); Morse, "A Japan and her People Praised;" Morse, On the Importance of Good Manners (Boston: H. B. Hastings, 1894), pp. 18-19; Morse, Japan Day By Day , I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1917), p. 112; II, pp. 266, 344, 401-02, 435; Morse, Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings (Boston: Ticknor, 1886), p. 249. His letters to Boston and Salem newspapers argued that the United States should remit to Japan indemnity monies wrongfully extorted from her. See: "The Japanese Indemnity Fund" *Boston Evening Transcript*, January 8, 1876; "The Japanese Indemnity Fund," *Salem Gazette*, January 14,1876.

The roots of Morse's contemporary and historical popularity lie, unlike Hepburn's, in more than the teaching of useful scientific techniques (Morse, 1917, Vol. II, p. 98).[7] The very thrust of Morse activities was positive in terms of what he offered a developing society. His actions derived from a deeply- held empathy for the nation and people he was trying to assist. While Morse, like many *yatoi*, argued that "only a high civilization" like Japan was capable of so quickly adopting foreign ways, he then went beyond the common Western assessment of Japanese as "apt pupils" to also urge a Western appreciation for some of Japan's creations, institutions, and cultural history. Morse, unlike Hepburn and most other *yatoi*, played a role in stimulating a Japanese effort to "preserve the national excellencies" (*kokusui hozon*) and to glorify indigenous art, architecture, life and customs. His technical information, coupled with his preservation of traditional Japanese culture, far from extending foreign political or cultural hegemony, assisted Japanese to grow materially and spiritually and thereby to resist Western political and cultural encroachment.

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[7] Accolades given to Morse include the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class and accolades given to Hepburn include the same order, awarded to him on his ninetieth birthday in 1905. Griffis concluded that Hepburn was "of the four great pioneers of the gospel in Japan . . . possibly the first in general usefulness" (Griffis, 1913, pp. vii, 228). Iglehart concludes that Hepburn's "versatility as physician, linguist, educator and church builder made him the most venerated of the early missionaries . . . the dean of the community . . . [and] the Nestor of the movement" Iglehart (1959, pp. 33, 60, 83). In 1870 Daniel Crosby Greene rated his colleague Hepburn as "the ablest and best missionary here" (Greene, 1927, p. 97). For additional accolades see William Griffis (1900, p. 360) and The New York Times, September 22, 1913.

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An Unequal Alliance: United States - Japanese Postwar Relations, The Mutual Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960

Arlene Lazarowitz
California State University, Long Beach

Teaching about post World War II Japanese-American relations will help students to understand the connection between the American determination to avoid the mistakes made after World War I in dealing with a vanquished nation at the same time that it grappled with cold war issues. Students should also understand why Japan, once it emerged from the shock of defeat, was determined to create its own place in Asia. Thus, United States-Japanese foreign relations can only be fully understood and fairly judged in a classroom context that examines the divergent perceptions and interacting behaviors of both nations. A Washington-centered viewpoint is fundamentally distorting. Failure to take into account the history, economic interests, and political culture of each nation results in judging policies against the standards, values, and assumptions of American decision-makers. When both American and Japanese sources are used as part of lectures and class assignments, the tendency to exaggerate American influence on Japan is diminished and students come to understand the Japanese experience as well as the American. By grasping the external as well as internal determinants of American post-World War II relations with Japan, students gain a broadened, enriched level of global sophistication that can be used as a basis for understanding the implications of Cold War policies.

The post-World War II Japanese-American alliance that originated as an unequal partnership in 1951 was modified more to Japanese satisfaction in 1960. An examination of these developments will augment our understanding of the differing perceptions of communist containment, issues of global economic concern, and the role of domestic political constraints in both countries, as well as the maturing of the United States-Japanese relationship.

The Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, signed in San Francisco in 1951 as part of the peace treaty that conclusively ended the post World War II American occupation of Japan, was a phase in a succession of changes in Japanese-American relations. The occupation, originally devised to establish economic, political, and social reforms to guarantee a demilitarized, democratic state in Japan, reversed course in 1947 at the height of United States communist containment concerns. Japan would now become a major bulwark against the spread of communism in East Asia (Schaller, 1985, p. 71; Schoenberger, 1989, p. 10). Containment policies, such as the Truman Doctrine, which were originally designed for European developments,

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were inchoate regarding Asia and were transferred to Asia with little modification, opposition, or question from American policy makers, except for those voiced by George Kennan, originator of the containment policy. Kennan was concerned that the Soviet Union would consider Japan's remilitarization under United States protection as a provocation that could destabilize East Asia. By 1951, Soviet control of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the Communist revolution in China, Soviet successful testing of an atomic weapon, and the beginning of the Korean War guaranteed that the United States policy regarding Japan would become part of the containment policy.

From the American viewpoint, a mutual security treaty would promote bonds of alliance and friendship between two former adversaries and advance America's containment policies in Asia, while continuing American influence over Japan. Japan, on the other hand, wanted a peace treaty that would not interfere with its developing economic recovery or antagonize the Soviet Union or China. A proud nation compelled into unconditional surrender, Japan regarded the 1951 treaty as a sacrifice of national sovereignty and an accommodation to American security needs. These arrangements were to become a source of domestic bitterness and discord in Japan (Buckley, 1982, p. 47; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, p. 10; Nester, 1996, p. 250).

The 1951 treaty, which was not based on mutual consultation, was not what the Japanese initially had in mind. According to the security treaty, United States troops would be stationed on military bases in Japan for action in other parts of East Asia, and the Japanese government would have no control over these bases. United States forces could be used to intervene in Japanese internal civil matters. No explicit guarantee was made of United States protection of Japan against an external attack. Japan could not grant base rights to any third country without United States consent. Finally, no provision was made for termination of the treaty (Weinstein, 1996, p. 250). Unquestionably the treaty was tailored to American needs and interests (Schonberger, 1977, p. 356; Dower, 1999, p. 552). Neutrality, which the United States believed would invite the Soviet Union to absorb Japan into its orbit, thus unsettling the bipolar balance of power, was not a viable option. Japan had to be oriented toward the West, with the common purpose of withstanding the communist threat (Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, February 8, 1951, p. 46).

Japan and the United States viewed the treaty in essentially opposite ways. By 1951, the Cold War had become institutionalized in American foreign policy. From both a policymaking and congressional funding outlook, foreign aid and mutual security that emphasized spending on military hardware had become synonymous. Outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 made Japan an immediate concern and ensured that American bases in Japan, from which American forces could oversee the Pacific trade routes, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Japan, would become crucial staging areas, especially in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union or Communist China. Any desire the Japanese had for a demilitarized and neutralized nation evaporated (Buckley, 1982, p. 37; Kennan,

1964, p. 14; Nester, 1996, p. 251; Sneider, 1982, pp. 14-15; Jarries, 1987, p. 190). Apart from the Korean War, these bases symbolized a means for the United States to extend its power quickly to intercept any attacks against American interests and to advance American influence and power. The Korean War made East Asia an important factor in communist containment planning. In 1953, the President's Committee on International Information Activities recommended that Japan be again considered "a major military factor in the Far East," since, with the exception of Korea, Western forces in the region were not "in proportion to the dimensions of the military threat" (President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953, p. 1816).

Instead of deepening and broadening friendship between Japan and the United States, the treaty became one of the most consistent sources of friction. American domestic political constraints played a pivotal role. When the Japanese balked at agreeing not to recognize Communist China, which they viewed as a potential source for raw materials, more than half of the United States Senators, led by William F. Knowland (Republican of California), wrote President Harry S. Truman that they would obstruct ratification of the treaty unless Japan agreed to cancel such recognition intentions ("56 in Senate bar Tokyo-Peiping ties," p. 1) Japan "was compelled to sign the Tokyo-Taipai Pact of 1952 with the Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan that brought it into the American-sponsored economic and political blockade of China (Schonberger, Winter 1986, p. 73; Dower, 1999, p. 552) John Foster Dulles, an experienced diplomatic and the carefully chosen Republican negotiator for a Democratic administration intent on winning support from a Senate that had been dominated by Republicans since 1947, demonstrated his lack of mastery of the situation when he indicated that he assumed the Japanese government was in a position to make clear its unwillingness to deal with the Chinese Communists ("Memorandum of conversation," September 9, 1951). He therefore prevailed upon Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to sign a separate peace agreement with Taiwan (Leffler, 1992, p. 464; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, p. 12; Neu, 1975, p. 215). The American Council on Japan, a nonofficial pressure group, also known as the Japan Lobby, joined with the China Lobby to capitalize on this anti-Communist hysteria and assure a non-recognition policy (Cohen, 1989, p. 39; Schonberger, 1977, p. 356).

President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had political concerns that came before United States-Japan relations. Support from the military bureaucracy that had grown stronger in the early postwar years, was essential to an administration caught in its Cold War rhetoric. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, troubled about what they considered a real danger of Soviet attack, argued for a retention of bases in Japan as a means of defending Taiwan against attack from Communist China even before the peace treaty was concluded and the occupation was formally ended. Anti-communist military containment would run from Alaska to the Philippines. East Asian experts in the State Department, who might have sounded a cautionary note, saw their role diminished as the China

expert John Paton Davies was accused of being soft on communism. Decisions concerning East Asia were made without their expertise (Dingman, 1976, pp. 472-491; Schaller, 1985, pp. 173, 176).

American officials appeared to have little interest in Japanese political constraints. The Japan of 1951 remained a nation in shock, devastated by the war and defeat. By the treaty provisions, Japan's external security would not be explicitly guaranteed, and the United States demanded that Japan increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense and that of the region. Japan would have little, if any, influence (Giffard, 1994, 155; Weinstein, 1996, 137-38). Dulles, who had little appreciation for or patience with Japanese barriers to rearmament, insisted on a 3,500,000 man army. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, which was drafted during the occupation and which prohibited the development of a military establishment in Japan, was popular with the Japanese public. Yet the State Department mistakenly contemplated that "either through amendment of their constitution or otherwise, the Japanese will be in a position to develop essential military forces." ("Guidelines for Fiscal 1953 foreign aid programs," p. 396). There were also Japanese concerns over reviving memories of prewar Japanese military dominance among Japan's Asian neighbors, whose markets and raw materials Japan needed for economic reconstruction. From a security perspective, the Japanese worried that the Soviets viewed Japan as an American satellite. Internally, the Japanese public was extremely anxious at the prospect of bringing the prewar generation of military officers back to power. Support for unarmed neutrality went far beyond the Socialists and Communists to encompass most of Japanese public opinion (Ariga. 1989, p. 61; Buckley, 1982, p. 40; Destler, *et. al.*, 1986, p. 14; Packard, 1966, pp. 17-30). Without a clear understanding of these views, the United States Information Agency concentrated on countering what it considered "heavy anti-American Communist propaganda" ("Report to the National Security Council," June 6, 1954, p. 1780).

The security treaty, which became a central component in Japan's political dialogue, was intertwined with unsettled Japanese feelings about war, peace, and national sovereignty. For example, the ineffective National Self-Defense Forces that the Japanese government created in place of a military establishment failed to satisfy Dulles's demands for an adequate Japanese defense force at the same time that they created friction within Japan (Auer, 1973, p. 255; Destler, *et. al.*, 1986, p. 15; Department of State Memorandum, August 31, 1955, pp. 98-99; Nester, 1996, pp. 270-71; Neu, 1975, pp. 216-217). American officials were apprised by a secretly prepared 1953 report by the Psychological Strategy Board that disclosed that American prestige, though strong, was now competing with a growing Japanese nationalism sensitive to any perceived infringement of Japanese sovereignty or interference in its internal affairs. This nationalistic sentiment, the report emphasized, was responsible for the popular concept that Japan was an unequal partner in the Japanese-American relationship and that the Japanese regarded the 1951 treaty as a continuation of occupation coercion (Psychological Strategy Board, November 9, 1953, pp. 1506-1507). The United States government

acted as though the Cold War made Japanese hopes for neutrality irrelevant. The United States failed to appreciate Japan's aversion to accepting medium range ballistic missiles that reminded the Japanese of the atomic bomb. Concerned with reducing American conventional forces, the Eisenhower administration relied increasingly on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to deter a potential Soviet attack.

Japan reluctantly agreed to accept its role as defender of the "free world," which was an American, not a Japanese, priority. United States warnings of a real and immediate threat from Communist China were not taken seriously by either the Japanese government or public. China had neither air nor naval forces capable of striking Japan, and many Japanese viewed American bases as conceivably inviting an attack against Japan. The Japanese and Chinese were interested in furthering trade ties. Secure under the American "nuclear umbrella," Japan took advantage of United States protection to pursue its interest in the raw materials and markets of the Third World, not cold war strategy. As early as 1952, the National Security Council predicted that Japan's "conception of self-interest . . . may come into conflict with the interests of the United States." The United States concern for Japan's economic prosperity was tied to its interests in keeping China and the Soviet from benefitting from Japan's industrial potential (National Security Council, 1952, p. 1303; Leffler, 1992, pp. 467-468). Socialists, Communists, and trade unionists spearheaded a broadly-supported anti-base movement that exploited popular anti-militarist, pacifist sentiment to capitalize on every major and minor base issue to generate mass demonstrations (Buckley, 1982, p. 39; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, pp. 15, 17; Giffard, 1995, p. 159; Iriye, 1994, pp. 47-48; Oksenberg, 1994, p. 99; Sneider, 1982, pp. 11-12, 19-20; Weinstein, 1996, p. 49). Socialists claimed that the presence of American troops and bases in Japan was as apt to incite the Soviet Union into a pre-emptive nuclear attack as to function as a deterrent. As the major opposition party in Japan, the Socialist opposition was significant. The dominant objective of its foreign policy was neutralism, in particular termination of the Security Treaty and the securing of independence from the United States (Giffard, 1994, p. 155; Stockwin, 1968, pp. vii, 16-17).

By the middle of the 1950s, as the shock of World War II wore off, the treaty increasingly became a liability for the Japanese government. Japan's economy was flourishing, it had acquired a seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1958, and the government had developed its own foreign policy separate from and often critical of that of the United States. Japan criticized American nuclear testing, restored relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, and maintained a balance between the two Chinas. Many Japanese viewed the security treaty as a roadblock. Japan had emerged as a force to be respected in Asia (Buckley, 1982, pp. 48, 58, Packard, 1966, p. 34).

As tensions increased between China and the United States over the Taiwan Straits, Japan became anxious that United States naval operations on the Japanese islands of Yokusuka and Sasebo

might invite retaliation for hosting military operations. Simmering discontent pointed to the need for a major reevaluation of the unequal partnership. While Dulles, who had now become President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State, continued to make uncompromising public statements about the obligations of America's allies and to lecture Prime Minister Ichiro Hayotama's emissaries about Japan's failure to make a significant contribution to regional defense, talks leading to substantial policy adjustments were already in progress. Hayotoma was determined to forge an equal relationship with the United States on security issues (Nester, 1996, p. 272) As the Japanese recovered their economic strength and national self-confidence, the treaty functioned as a reminder of defeat and occupation. By 1954, American officials, noting the political restraints in the Japanese Diet, urged that continued pressure be maintained upon Japanese officials in private interviews, but advised that it would be "adverse" to American interests "publicly to criticize the pace of their rearmament." (Acting director of the office of North Asia affairs memorandum, 1954, p. 1609).

It became abundantly clear by 1956 to the State Department that change was necessary and urgent (Buckley, 1982, p. 76). American officials in the embassy in Tokyo argued for modification of Dulles's and the Department of Defense's hard line (Buckley, 1982, p. 33; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, p. 15; Aruga, 1989, p. 66). As late as 1958, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs continued to argue for the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Dulles responded that it seemed to him that "the Japanese should accept the basic premise that their future lies in close cooperation with the United States to create a balance of power against the Soviet Union and Communist China." The Assistant Secretary simplified the situation when he maintained that cooperative long-term United States-Japanese relations would depend "primarily" upon raw materials and export markets in the United States. Only when the Japanese-American relationship became this strained did the compelling issue reach the top echelons of the Eisenhower administration (Buckley, 1982, p. 58; Robertson, 1958, p. 10; Dulles, 1958, pp. 14-15).

After reexamining the relationship, oftentimes at the behest of Douglas MacArthur II, United States Ambassador to Japan, the United States government finally recognized the need for revisions in the treaty. MacArthur was firmly convinced that temporizing would "lead to a serious deterioration in our relations with Japan . . . and encourage those elements in Japan which seek to shift Japan's orientation away from the United States" (MacArthur, 1958, p. 22; Embassy in Japan, 1958, pp. 34-35). Similarly, a 1958 National Intelligence Estimate contended that if negotiations for revision of the Security Treaty did not end in a mutually satisfactory agreement, United States-Japanese relations "would gradually deteriorate" (National Intelligence Estimate, 1958, p. 114). Formal negotiations began between Ambassador MacArthur and Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fugiyama. Despite Pentagon opposition, both sides recognized the need for a treaty that finally recognized Japanese political realities (Sneider, 1982, p. 31). The new treaty, signed in 1960, was

one of mutual cooperation and security between both nations, with each agreeing to prior consultation on key military matters and pledging to settle quarrels by United Nations charter rules. The understanding was fixed at a ten-year limit and the United States guaranteed Japan's external security (Weinstein, 1996, pp. 139-141).

Nevertheless, when the treaty was submitted to the Diet for ratification, it became the subject of renewed debate. A coalition of left-wing forces, the labor movement, and student groups alarmed that Japan would become a battlefield in a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, attempted to prevent legislative approval. Some feared that the treaty would oblige Japan to develop large-scale armed forces. Others wanted Japan to have veto power, not mere consultation, on the use of bases, especially after the 1956 U-2 incident, when it was disclosed that three U-2 planes were stationed in Japan. Some feared being drawn into the Vietnam War on the American side. Others thought the ten-year term too long. Socialists wanted total abolition, not revision (Aruga, 1989, p. 72; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, p. 21; Neu, 1975, pp. 217-220; Sneider, 1982, p. 33; Stockwin, 1968, p. 86). Student radicals invaded the yard of the Diet. A student was killed and Eisenhower's press secretary had to be rescued by helicopter near Haneda airport (Giffard, 1994, p. 162)

Ambassador MacArthur argued that, in order to demonstrate to the Japanese that the United States attached equal importance to its alliance with Japan as it did to that of European countries, President Eisenhower should visit Japan (MacArthur, 1959, pp. 223-224). As conditions disintegrated, the American Embassy continued to hold that it should be the Japanese government that ought to cancel, if that become necessary, not the United States, since this "could be a mortal blow to [Prime Minister Nobusuke] Kishi." (Embassy in Japan, May 25, 1960, p. 329; Embassy in Japan, June 8, 1960, p. 330). Demonstrations became so violent that Eisenhower's planned visit had to be canceled when the Japanese government could not guarantee his safety (Kishi, 1960, p. 370). Ultimately, though, the protests were more in opposition to Kishi than anti-American. Using his Liberal Democratic Party majority, Kishi had employed parliamentary maneuvers to cut off debate and force the treaty through the Diet without allowing for public debate. No socialists were in the Diet chamber when the Liberal Democratic Party took a sudden vote on the treaty. The crisis destroyed Kishi's political value and he was obliged to resign five days after ratification (Aruga, 1989, p. 72; Destler, *et. al.*, 1976, p. 21; Neu, 1975, p. 220; Sneider, 1982, p. 33; Stockwin, 1968, p. 95). In forcing the treaty through the Diet, Kishi violated basic Japanese norms of consensus, in which all major participants, including opponents, should indicate their consent, if not approval (Giffard, 1994, p. 161; Nester, 1996, p. 274). These maneuvers were perceived as an attack on the democratic process.

Although termed a mutual security treaty, a wide gap continued in the relationship between Washington and Tokyo for some time after 1960. Events in Latin America and Vietnam eclipsed

presidential interest in Japan. Instead of a grand strategy, American policy toward Japan was made by bureaucrats in the Defense and State Departments intent on enforcing the geopolitical alliance with Japan. Sovereignty over Okinawa, which was finally returned to Japan in 1970, along with trade occupied Japan's attention throughout the 1960s. In 1965, it achieved the trade surplus with the United States that it had sought. At this point, the Johnson administration, occupied elsewhere, failed to address this rivalry (Aruga, 1989, p. 76; Nester, 1996, pp. 275, 286, 291; Destler, pp.23-35).

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The Social Significance of the Japanese Tea Ceremony

Mohamed D. Turay
Savannah State University

Chado,[1] the "way of tea," is one of several Japanese "ways" or traditions that are passed from one generation to the next (Hoover, 1977). Other ways include flower arrangement, painting, fencing, calligraphy, poetry, and self-defense. Ways serve as educational tools for lay people, practitioners and devotees, and their significance has been widely documented (Dumolin, 1979; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977; Soshitsu, 1998). *Chanoyu* (literally "hot water for tea"), the Japanese tea ceremony, is the vehicle through which the principles of *chado* are manifested. To understand fully the significance of *chanoyu* in Japanese society, it is first necessary to examine its development over the centuries.

Chanoyu, the Japanese tea ceremony, has its spiritual roost in Zen Buddhism. Thanks to Noami, Rikyu, and other great tea masters, *chanoyu* has developed into a "way" of *chado*, which is now intricately linked with the lives of the Japanese. *Chajin*, tea practitioners, devote their lives to *chanoyu*, and live by its four principles: harmony, respect, purity, and tranquillity. The Zen tradition of "transmission of the teachings outside of words" is the basis from which Rikyu established these four guiding principles. *Chanoyu*, however, is more than a performance or a religious ritual. It is a pastime, the means of learning social etiquette, and a tradition of almost five hundred years. Today the tea ceremony may have lost some of its glitter in the fast-paced Japanese society. However, it is still practiced by all social classes in Japan. Furthermore, its principles continue to be regarded as important, making *chanoyu* a subject of importance in the social sciences.

This research examines the social significance of the Japanese tea ceremony, *chanoyu*. The study briefly examines the history of *chanoyu*, its rituals and symbolism, as well as the significance of the ceremony within Japanese culture. Unlike many topics of socio-cultural interest, *chanoyu* has been widely studied. The current study, therefore, presents not so much a new idea but an attempt to understand *chanoyu* and the relevance of the ceremony in our understanding of the social and spiritual realms of Japanese society. The transformation of the ordinary into the extraordinary over what Americans may see as just a cup of tea, the mutual courtesy among guests, the courtesy between host and guests, the delight in seasonal change, the respect for utensils, and the regard for

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[1] Please see the glossary at the end of this article for definitions.

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silence are aspects of Japanese culture that *chanoyu* vividly captures. Understanding *chanoyu*, therefore, is an important step toward understanding Japanese society and culture.

HISTORY OF TEA/CHANOYU IN JAPAN

Among the numerous ways, *chado*, is one of the most popular and, according to Ito (1998) and *Soshitsu* (1998), few subjects in Japanese socio-cultural history have greater appeal for scholars than the tea ceremony. Hoover (1977) cites a legend that dates tea to 2737 BC. According to this legend, the tea bush can be traced to the Indian monk Bodhidharma (ca. 460- ca 534), the founder of Zen Buddhism. Bodhidharma found himself nodding toward the end of a nine-year period of meditation. Angry at his weakness, he tore off his eyelids and threw them away. A tea bush sprang up at the spot where they landed. As a result of this legend, it became customary for monks to congregate before Bodhidharma's image and participate in a sacred ritual of shared tea in his memory (Hoover, 1977). Zen monks throughout China eventually adopted this practice.

Hammitzsch (1993) and Hoover (1977) believe that it is impossible to pinpoint the date when tea was introduced to Japan. They can, however, identify several distinct phases of its history in that country: its introduction from China, the institution of tea parties and competitions, the birth, development and decline of the tea way, its resuscitation and perfection, and its eventual prominence in Japanese society. The practice of tea drinking declined when Japan broke off relations with China in 895. This decline continued until the famous Zen teacher Ei-sai (1141-1215) revived the custom in 1187 (Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998). During two visits to China, Ei-sai studied Zen philosophy and learned from Chinese monks how to cultivate and drink tea. He brought back seeds to Japan and recorded this acquired knowledge in two volumes (Hoover, 1977; Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998). After Ei-sai introduced his pupil Myoe (1173-1232) to tea, they both popularized tea drinking, although this custom was initially confined to monasteries (Soshitsu, 1998).

Tea-tasting parties similar to today's wine-tasting parties had been popular at the Chinese Sung court between 960-1279 (Hoover, 1977). When the Japanese nobility and warrior class eventually took up the ceremonial drinking of tea, they introduced tea-tasting parties which were also occasions for admiring Sung ceramics and discussing Sung theories of art (Hoover, 1977). Two separate but parallel schools thus developed: the ceremonial drinking of tea as entertainment for the aristocracy and as religious ritual among Zen monks (Hoover, 1977). The two schools' styles eventually merged into a single protocol known simply as the *tea* ceremony, *chanoyu* (Hoover, 1977; Soshitsu, 1998; Varley and Isao, 1989). Through religious ceremonies, the drinking of tea was also introduced to commoners, but *chanoyu* continued to be dominated by the aristocracy (Soshitsu, 1998). What brought about widespread participation in and reverence for tea ceremonies was the

introduction of tea competitions, which also had been popular in China since the Sung era. These competitions followed somewhat fixed rules, which subsequently gave the occasions their ritualistic character. It was through the influence of the warrior class, which was accustomed to a lifestyle of strict discipline, that the tea ceremony acquired its rigid set of rules (Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover 1977).

The contributions to the tea ceremony of two great tea masters, Noami (1397-1471) and Rikyu (1521-1591) are noteworthy. Noami, adviser and director "in matters of artistic taste at the house of the Shoguns" (Hammitzsch, 1993, p. 34), left a lasting impression on the formulation of the rules for tea gatherings. Rikyu was the tea instructor of Nobunaga (1534-1583) and Hideyoshi (1540-1615), the latter of whom was particularly devoted to the tea ceremony. Through this royal patronage, Rikyu formalized the fixed rules under which *chanoyu* is still practiced today. "The tea party of the single morning glory" (Hoover, 1977, p. 175) which he hosted is of special interest to scholars for its vivid portrayal of the Zen ideal of "sufficiency in restraint" (Hoover, 1977, p. 175). This facet of Zen tradition is also today a hallmark of *chanoyu* (Anderson, 1991; Dumolin, 1979; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977). Through the influence of Zen aesthetic theory, a plainer type of pottery replaced the polished ceramic bowls previously favored by the aristocracy, marking the beginning of the still-dominant tradition of "deliberate understatement" (Hoover, 1977, p.174). It was Rikyu who developed the four guiding principles under which *Chanoyu* is still practiced today: *wa* (harmony), *kei* (respect), *sei* (purity), and *jaku* (tranquility).

Next, the character of the warrior tea parties was changed forever when Yoshimasa (1435-1490) was persuaded by Zen monks to construct, for the sole purpose of drinking tea, a small room that would reflect the ceremony's monastic origins (Hoover, 1977). According to Hoover and Ito (1998), it then became necessary for anyone serving tea to first learn the ceremony's rituals. The discipline and general ambience associated with the tea ceremony were well in place by the sixteenth century (Hoover, 1977).

The gradual but complete transformation of *chanoyu* as a vehicle for preserving the Zen distaste for materialism soon followed: the thatched-roof hut, the replacement of the decorative utensils with unpretentious pottery, the introduction of simple flower arrangements and calligraphic scrolls—all were landmarks in the evolution of the tea ceremony (Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998). Collectively, these changes introduced into *chanoyu* the idea of artificial or deliberately created poverty. The relationship between Zen and tea is still evident as the popular Japanese expression "*chazen ichimi*" (Zen and tea are one) suggests (Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998).

THE TEA CEREMONY

The rituals of the formal tea ceremony allow participants to become so relaxed that they are at one with their surroundings (Hoover, 1977; Mooney, 1996). Except in the case of a *rinji*, a spontaneous tea ceremony, a formal tea ceremony begins with the arrival of three or four invited guests (Mooney, 1996). Typically, they have each notified the host of their intentions to attend the ceremony. This notification is known as a *zenki*. Upon their arrival, all guests gather in the *machiai*, the garden shed or lodge. This waiting period is meant to encourage a relaxed state of mind and tranquility, a requirement of the Zen tradition (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998). From the *machiai*, guests walk to the tea garden in silence when called upon to do so either by the host or *honto*, an assistant.

The tea garden, *roji* (dewy path), is not a typical Japanese temple garden but a passage that connects the waiting area and the teahouse and has few adornments. A few stepping-stones divide the garden into two parts (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). Within the inner *roji* is a basin made of stone and a bamboo dipper, *kishaku*, which guests use to rinse their mouths and hands (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). The ceremonial silence continues during the walk through the tea garden. Any conversation that does take place centers on praise for the garden, the host's good taste, the beauty of the season, and other pleasantries (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1997). For an evening ceremony a stone lantern is lighted (Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998; Soshitsu, 1970). The guests are ritualistically ushered into the tearoom in single file. The host, *teishu*, or the host's assistant, leads the way, followed by the *shokyaku*, the guest of honor.

The *chashitsu*, the teahouse, is a small wooden hut with a thatched roof and gray plaster walls. It is asymmetrical and its floor is raised above the ground (Hoover, 1977). One of the most significant features of this structure—indeed, of the entire tea ceremony—is the conspicuous absence of a regular door leading into the teahouse. Guests remove their shoes and crawl through a small square opening, the *nijiriguchi*, which separates the interior of the teahouse from the adjoining preparation area, the *mizuya* (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). The tearoom is sparsely decorated with only a small *tokonomo* art alcove on whose back wall a single scroll is hung (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1997). This may be a mounted poem, referred to as *a shikishi*, or a *shosoku*, a mounted letter written by an important tea master (Anderson, 1991). Although the room appears to be simple and rustic, Hoover (1977) notes that this impression is deceptive since only the finest wood is used to construct it. Usually the tearoom costs considerably more per unit area than the host's home, and "in spite of its obvious simplicity, the room betrays every mark of thoughtful designing" (Suzuki, 1959, p. 299). Tearooms, in other words, are carefully planned to appear completely unplanned.

Kaiseki is a formal tea gathering at which dinner is served, originally a simple meal of soup and three other dishes (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). When all the guests are seated, the *teishu* enters the room. The host kneels gently, bows to his or her guests, and disappears through the same sliding door. He or she then returns immediately with the tea utensils, which may then be examined briefly by each guest (Anderson, 1991). The host again leaves only to return and announce that the meal is ready to be served. Continuing the ritual, the host leaves and returns with each guest's meal on a *oshiki*, a tray. Each guest bows and takes his or her tray with both hands (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). The meal is simpler than a regular Japanese ceremonial meal such as a wedding or a formal business dinner, but *kaiseki* nonetheless is considered "the flower of Japanese cuisine" (Anderson, 1991, p.169). Also the dishes are of superior quality than those used at regular meals (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). Hot *sake*, Japanese rice wine, is then served (Anderson, 1991). Finally, sweets are served, signifying the end of the meal (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977).

The host bows then withdraws and the guests file out of the tearoom into the waiting lodge in the same order in which they had entered (Anderson, 1991; Ito, 1998). This interval is called *nakadachi*. Once in the waiting area, the guests may talk (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). At the appropriate time, the host announces the beginning of the actual tea ceremony by striking a gong (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977; Mooney, 1996). When the guests return, they find another kind of atmosphere in the tearoom with flowers on the wall instead of the calligraphy. (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977; Soshitsu, 1998). A charcoal fire seasoned with incense and pine needles now glows, and boiling water in a kettle called a *kama* is on the side. At the bottom of the kettle are small pieces of iron that produce a sound suggesting "wind in a pine forest" (Hoover, 1977, p.178).

The host is seated on the floor when the guests return, and beside him or her are the implements of the formal tea ceremony: *chaire*, a ceramic tea caddy containing *koicha*, thick, powdered green tea; *chashaku*, a bamboo scoop; *mizusashi* a jar of cold water to replenish the kettle; *hishaku*, a water dipper made of bamboo; a container for used water called *kensui;* an incense holder; *chasen*, a tea whisk; *chakin*, a linen napkin for wiping the tea bowl; and *chawan*, the tea bowl itself. The tea utensils are collectively referred to as the *chadogu*. Much thought and planning have been put into their selection (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998). They had been carefully selected for their special aesthetic qualities, but the tea bowl is the center of attention. The guests are now served *omogashi*, moist *sweets,* in preparation for the somewhat bitter tea which will soon follow (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998).

With everything ready and within reach, the seated host prepares the green tea. Hoover (1977) describes the host's gestures as meticulous, "a seated dance, an orchestrated ritual, as deliberate, paced, and formal as the elevation of the Catholic Mass" (p. 179). The host now rinses the tea bowl with hot water from the kettle and wipes it with a napkin. Then he or she uses the

bamboo scoop to transfer powdered tea from the caddy to the tea bowl, and adds boiling water from the kettle. With the bamboo whisk, the host gradually blends the tea and water until the dry powder is transformed into a beverage (Hoover, 1977; Mooney, 1996). All the guests watch the host's movements with admiration. The *shokyaku,* the guest of honor, is first in line and is served first (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Mooney, 1996). The host bows in front of the guest of honor who bows back as he or she receives the bowl. The *shokyaku* then samples the tea and compliments the host on its superb taste and quality (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Mooney, 1996). As a sign of respect for the artist and his/her design on the front, the *shokyaku* rotates the bowl slightly before taking the first sip (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Mooney, 1996). After three and one half sips (Mooney, 1996), he or she wipes the rim of the bowl with a *chakin* and passes the bowl to the next guest with a bow (Anderson, 1991; Mooney, 1996). This ritual is repeated until all guests have had their turn, the host being the only one present who does not taste the tea (Anderson, 1991). The bowl is rinsed and another kind of sweets (*higashi*) is served. Another bowl of powdered tea is then whisked into a beautiful frothy foam and served to each guest individually. This second bowl of tea is *usucha*, or thin tea (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993). During a long tea ceremony the charcoal is rearranged between the serving of thick and thin tea (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993), and at some gatherings, only thin tea is served (Anderson, 1991).

The formal part of the ceremony is completed, and guests can now relax, enjoy more sweets or steamed rice cakes called *mochi,* and discuss Zen aesthetics (Hoover, 1977). Anderson (1991), Hoover (1977), and Ito (1998) observe that at this point comments about the flower arrangements, "poetry appropriate to the season" (Hoover, 1977, p. 181), and praise for the tea's strength, taste, and color are also appropriate. The discussion also usually includes painters, tea masters and their achievements, tea utensils, calligraphy, and the tastes of different periods in Japanese history, especially as they relate to the tea ceremony (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998). At this stage in the ceremony (*haiken*), the guest of honor asks the host's permission to examine all the utensils in detail and to ask questions about their origins, history, and the artists who made them. Each guest slowly spreads his or her own *fukusa*, a silk cloth, which the host has provided or which the guests had brought to the ceremony. The utensils rest on the *fukusa* while being examined. After a guest has examined a utensil, it is passed to the next guest until all have had their turn (Anderson, 1991 Hammitzsch, 1993). As before, the tea bowl is the focus of the conversation (Anderson, 1991; Hoover, 1977). As each guest picks it up, he or she supports it with the right hand while rotating it gently with the left (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Mooney, 1996).

Any mention of the outside world is prohibited in this room (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977; Mooney, 1996). Instead, "values have been subtly guided into perspective, spirits purified, appreciation of beauty rewarded" (Hoover, 1977, p. 181). Each guest should now

be relaxed in a peaceful atmosphere devoid of distractions (Anderson, 1991; Mooney, 1996; Soshitsu, 1970).

SYMBOLISM

A review of the literature suggests that *chanoyu* is not just an opportunity to quench one's thirst, learn social etiquette, and display fine utensils. Nor is it merely a pastime for the privileged (Ito, 1998; Soshitsu, 1970). According to Soshitsu (1970), it is a five hundred-year-old tradition that is important in the lives of all Japanese, regardless of social class. Ito believes that "the impact of chanoyu on Japanese culture is incalculable" (1998, p. 1). *Chado* is a sociological field of study popular among university faculty (Ito, 1998), perhaps in the same way that "social stratification" and "race relations" are popular among faculty at U.S. institutions. Universities in Japan also have student tea clubs with advisers who help students understand the meaning of the way and its techniques (Mooney, 1996). The ceremony is popular among young brides (Mooney, 1996), and tea schools, *yabunochi*, can be found everywhere in the country (Mooney, 1996). Ito (1998) reports that for the first time in its history, the Idemitsu Museum of Art in Tokyo recently held an exhibition devoted to the tea ceremony that featured about one hundred artifacts used in the tea ceremony.

It is clear from the literature that *chanoyu* affects many areas of traditional and modern Japanese life. Mooney points out that "every aspect of the tea ceremony embodies numerous Japanese arts" (1996, p.1): pottery/ceramics (tea utensils), calligraphy (the traditional calligraphy scroll placed in the alcove); flower arrangement, and dance and drama embodied in the graceful movements of the host and to some extent in the guests' movements (Anderson, 1991; Mooney, 1996; Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998). The ceremony also promotes intellectual and personal development: Buddhist meditation (kneeling in silence for long hours); cuisine (the kaiseki meal and sweets served during the ceremony); poetry (Anderson, 1991; Mooney, 1996; Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998); landscape gardening; and architecture, represented by the teahouse(Anderson, 1991; Mooney, 1996; Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998).

Of no less importance is *chanoyu's* religious symbolism. Sociologists define symbols as verbal and nonverbal expressions intended to represent something and transmit meaning from sender to receiver. In religion, these symbols are linked to ritualistic patterns of ceremonial behavior that structure a social setting. Although *chanoyu* is not strictly a religious ceremony, its origins date back to Zen Buddhism and to the monks whose teachings still inform the ceremony. Bodhidharma's reputation for wisdom attracted many followers who were drawn to his brand of meditation or, *Dhyana*, a Sanskrit term the Chinese pronounced as *Ch'an*, later to be called Zen by the Japanese (Hoover, 1977). Warriors, statesmen, businessmen, monks, and commoners have all followed *chado*.

All were directly or indirectly students of Zen monks who had introduced tea to Japan as part of their religious practices. The continuing link between tea and Zen in Japan is therefore not surprising.

Hammitzsch (1993) believes that *chanoyu* is the embodiment and essence of Zen culture and traditions from which the great tea master Rikyu established the four guiding principles of *chanoyu* (Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977). Throughout the ceremony, Zen symbolism is experienced: moisture (tea) relieves the aridness of life; the slow, silent, and deliberate steps into the tearoom symbolize entry into the tranquil world of tea, leaving the noisy outside world behind (Anderson, 1991). The *niriguchi* conveys an important symbolic message: those who are entering the teahouse are to *leave* all worldly dignity, pride, and social status outside. Only the humble and unassuming can enter (Anderson, 1987, 1991; Mooney, 1996). The teahouse is constructed with perishable material -bamboo, wood, mud, reeds, and straw-all denoting a natural simplicity that symbolizes the temporary nature of life (Anderson, 1991). The rustic garden captivates and mystifies guests, transforming them from ordinary people into worry-free individuals ready for the unique experience of the tea ceremony; every step into the depths of the garden is a step away from the outside world and its problems (Hoover, 1977; Ito, 1998; Soshitsu, 1970). The rice in the bowl is shaped like the Japanese character for "one" to symbolize that among food, rice is *primus inter pares*. The tea bowl occupies a position of prominence in the tea ceremony because of its symbolic value. Anderson (1991) believes that because it is shared among the guests, the tea bowl represents communication and since it touches the lips, it also represents intimacy.

Purification is symbolized by the sprinkling of water in the *roji*, the ritual cleansing of the mouth and hands before entering the tearoom, and by wiping the utensils immediately before the tea is prepared. Wiping the rim of the tea bowl before a guest passes it to the next guest is a purification ritual as well (Anderson, 1991; Hammitzsch, 1993; Hoover, 1977; Suzuki, 1959). The special way in which flowers are displayed in the tea ceremony is known as *chabana*, which is different from *ikebana*, the traditional Japanese art of flower arrangement. In *chabana*, flowers are placed in a vase unpretentiously. In *ikebana*, flowers are "arranged" (Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998). The vase used in a tea ceremony is unassuming in appearance, and often contains only one or a few (usually not an even number) flower buds (Hoover, 1997); *Ikebana* uses the term *ikeru* which means to arrange, while *chabana* uses *ireru* meaning to put in. This also means that only seasonal flowers would be used in *chanoyu*. This, and the fact that the flowers are used only for the duration of the ceremony symbolize the purity and the transitory nature of life (Anderson, 1991).

Tranquility and beauty through simplicity are experienced from the moment one enters the tea garden until the tea ceremony is over (Hoover, 1977). The single bench in the *machiai*, the silence among guests, the plain but elegant garden and utensils, and the solemn tea ceremony are a few symbols of simplicity. Harmony, too, is a theme that pervades the ceremony. *Chanoyu* blends

perfectly the three faces of Zen: physical art forms (architecture, flower arrangement, paintings, calligraphy, ceramics), tranquility, and aesthetics (Hammitzsch, 1993). Suzuki states that "the organs of hearing, smell, and sight are engaged even before the ceremony begins" (1959, p. 299) while the guests are still in the garden. The organs of taste and touch join their noble colleagues for the rest of the ceremony, creating the sense of harmony favored in Zen. Also the five elements (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water) are blended perfectly in the tearoom. These elements are related in nature: wood creates fire, fire in turn creates ashes (earth), earth creates metal in it, metal forms dew (water), and water provides nourishment for trees (wood). The relationship among these elements is brought out in the ceremony, suggesting *chanoyu's* dedication to harmony. Respect is symbolized by the courtesy and praise shown toward the host, the mutual respect among the guests, and the guests' respect for the utensils they use and the objects around them.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

The annals of the use of tea do not identify Japan as its place of origin, and most Japanese do not grow up being socialized in *chanoyu* or in the symbolic language of tea. Today, however, the ceremony is central to Japanese national identity, with practitioners from diverse social classes. Through *chado* and more specifically through *chanoyu*, the art of drinking tea has been transformed into an educational and social tool with far-reaching implications in Japanese society. What then is the significance of the tea ceremony, and how can its continued prominence as a cultural entity be explained?

In the first place, every aspect of *chanoyu* represents various Japanese art forms. In this regard, therefore, chanoyu can be identified as a cultural activity that unifies art forms prominent in Japanese society, literally bringing them together under one roof. Since its monastic origins, males, who continue to direct all pertinent changes, had dominated the way of tea in general, and chanoyu in particular. However, since the early 1900's, more women than men have participated in both *chado* and *chanoyu* (Anderson, 1991; Lebra, 1984). Inequality between the sexes and the subordinate role of females in Japan has usually been cited as reasons for this change in trend. Kristof (1996) asserts that gender discrimination and inequality are deep-rooted in Japan, where women suffer discrimination and prejudice unparalleled in the industrialized world. He points out that women constitute more than 40 percent of Japan's workforce, and 70 percent of married women with teenage children work outside the home. However, they earn only about 50 percent of men's wages. Also, less than 10 percent of Japanese managers are women, one of the lowest ratios in the world. In this regard, women are doing better in countries that are much less developed such as Zimbabwe and Mexico, where women are twice as likely to be managers as in Japan (Kristof, 1996). Iritani

(1996) asserts that career prospects had improved for Japanese women since the passing of equal opportunity legislation in 1987. However, harsher times returned for women during the recession. Too often, they are the "first fired in a society where they still are not taken seriously in the workplace," resulting in an "exodus of some of the most talented women to the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore"(Iritani, 1996, p.1). There is evidence also that sexual harassment against women in the workplace has increased in recent years (MacGregor, 1995).

The way of tea and participation in the tea ceremony may thus provide an outlet for self-fulfillment for women who are traditionally denied such opportunities in Japan. Few other outlets are provided for women to participate in activities without being assigned subordinate roles. Lebra (1984), emphasizes the important role that involvement in the ceremony can play in the life cycles of Japanese females. Typically, their introduction to the tea ceremony occurs during their traditional bridal training, when they are exposed to flower arrangement, classical music and dance, and the principles and rituals of the tea ceremony. The goal of this training is for young women to become familiar with proper manners, discipline, and comportment, and most women generally do not use these skills to entertain their husbands. One consequence of this experience, however, is the likelihood of making a lifelong commitment to an age or marriage cohort, a particular tea master, or tea school. This commitment can continue for the rest of the women's lives as they move through the different stages of their adult life cycles: before children are born, when they are old enough not to require constant supervision, when adult children leave home, or after a husband dies. Lebra (1984), also sees the formation of long-lasting peer groups among middle-aged women as a contributing factor for their increased participation in the tea ceremony. These groups meet to study the tea way and ritual, participate in *chanoyu*, and organize tours to places that promote intellectual and spiritual interests including famous teahouses and temples.

The shift in gender participation can also be attributed to a number of circumstances in Japanese society that have given women more free time to pursue interests outside the home: the modern economy, technological advancement, decrease in family size, and increase in neolocal residence. Modern technology has freed women from hours of tedious housework, which washing machines, electric stoves and microwave ovens can now do in a fraction of the time it used to take. It is now also customary for newlyweds to reside in neutral homes away from the grooms' parents, thereby cutting down on domestic responsibility for brides. The decrease in the number of children would have the same effects as well. The result of these changes is that more women have more time for themselves before they start having children, in the early stages of their marriage, and after their children are grown.

Another noteworthy aspect of *chanoyu* is supported by Anderson who points out that "sociability and self-improvement are dominant themes in Japanese society, themes that are

reinforced by participation in the tea ceremony (1991, p). The tea ceremony also provides an outlet for young Japanese of both sexes to organize their leisure time around group activities. Lebra (1976) contends that the Japanese are sensitive to, and concerned about belongingness and togetherness to such an extent, that they feel alive only when in a group. Within the group, there is no room for individual personality, resulting in a feeling of oneness with other group members. Those who share the same belongingness get together to enjoy intimate interactions and confirm mutual solidarity. Membership in a tea group or participating in tea rituals may thus satisfy this need for belongingness. In addition, to the Japanese, physical togetherness does not require verbal communication, a condition that is captured vividly by the silence in the tearoom, and the solemn nature of the tea ceremony. Young and old Japanese of both sexes may also be attracted to the tea ritual because of the tranquility it offers, a welcome change from the hectic and fast-paced life most Japanese today have to deal with on a daily basis.

Sociologists of the functionalist persuasion such as Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and Kingsley Davis view society as an ongoing equilibrium of social institutions that patterns human behavior on the basis of shared norms. The social system itself is seen as consisting of interdependent parts. The theory further postulates that all forms of institutionalized behavior have a function in relation to the maintenance of the social system, although that function may be manifest or latent (Merton, 1957; Parsons, 1951).

Since *chanoyu* has been linked most often to religion than to any of the other social institutions, the relationship between *chanoyu* and religion warrants some attention. Durkheim (1965) maintained that all acts which pertain to religion are sacred and public, while magical acts are profane and private. If the sociological definition of sacred as "that which people set apart as extraordinary, inspiring a sense of awe and reverence" (Macionis, 2000, p. 451) is used, then several aspects of *chanoyu* can be identified as sacred: a sacred space, a natural space enhanced by human art and craft and consecrated by deliberate arrangement is involved; sacred writing, revered because it came from divinely inspired writers, feature prominently in *chanoyu;* there are sacred acts performed according to prescribed patterns; and religious drama which combines philosophy and sacred actions permeate the ceremony. These features are not unique to *chanoyu* since sacred places, writings, and drama are found in all the major world religions. Also in all societies, some objects and activities are set apart as special, sacred, or holy. They are treated differently from those objects that are ordinary, secular, or profane. Even in societies where religion has been banned or is nonexistent, there are places, people, and activities that are set apart from ordinary life.

The rigid procedures associated with the tea ceremony and the formal demeanor of participants have led some observers to identify the tea ceremony as ritual. Using the sociological definition of rituals as repetitive actions performed to express central values, "ritualistic" seems an

appropriate description of the procedures of the tea ceremony. Does the presence of symbols and ritualistic behavior, however, qualify the tea ceremony as a religious activity? Southwold (1978), provides a list of twelve essential characteristics which must apply to any activity defined as religious. Regarding the tea ceremony, the list appears to be split evenly down the middle: *chado* is not associated with god-like beings directly, although the ritual drinking of tea is believed to have started in monasteries. Also there are no systems of beliefs based on faith, and no supernatural sanctions against violating its codes. On the other hand, *chado* has an orientation toward salvation, ritual practices pervade the ceremony, a specialist elite is involved, and there is an association with an ethnic group. Perhaps more important, one of the most authoritative scholars on the subject, Sen Soshitsu XV, suggests that the tea ceremony is religious in nature. His argument is firmly grounded in a thorough and scholarly understanding of the history of tea and the principles and philosophy of *chado* and *chanoyu*.

As a religious activity then, how does *chanoyu* contribute to the maintenance of the Japanese social system? Davis (1948) believes that religion makes a valuable contribution to social integration by providing through rituals a means for the constant renewal of the group's sentiments; through its sacred objects religion provides a tangible reference and rallying point for the shared values of the group. Religion also provides an explanation of group ends and justification of their primacy. Durkheim (1954) emphasizes that the performance of religious rituals reasserts the sanctity of norms and reestablishes the solidarity of the group. Through its principles and rituals *chanoyu* can provide a sense of stability and belonging to its practitioners, as well as contribute to the maintenance of the Japanese social system.

In addition, people in all societies including the technologically advanced Japan confront problems and dilemmas that cannot be handled in terms of empirical knowledge alone. Anderson points out that the Japanese, borrowing from Chinese Taoism, recognized "chaos in their own mythology of creation"(1991, p. 212). She points out, too, that the ancient wars, catastrophic fires, and frequent natural disasters are not myths but part of daily life. Sense must be made of these calamities, and ways of adjusting to them must be found. Religion provides an answer by allowing followers to establish a relationship with a sacred, more powerful ground of experience which *chanoyu* provides. Religion also contributes to personal development by integrating the individual into a meaningful relationship with sacred things and into one's group by ritual reassertion of religion's values and norms. This gives the individual the mechanisms for dealing with loss and frustration, thereby enlarging ones self-significance (Davis, 1948).

Royce (1982), points out that to maintain a believable identity, an ethnic group must have its own symbols, signs, and underlying values that members of the group and outsiders consider as unique to that group. The tea ceremony serves this purpose for the Japanese. *Chanoyu* is a symbol

of Japanese pride and ethnic identity. For this reason, they invite foreign visitors to tea ceremonies even if they themselves do not frequently or regularly take part in tea rituals. Anderson believes that the Japanese feel that attendance at a tea gathering is virtually mandatory for every visitor to Japan suggesting "that tea is something quintessentially Japanese" (1991, p. 220).

CONCLUSION

Chanoyu, the Japanese tea ceremony, is a tradition that dates back almost five hundred years. Today, it is deep rooted in Japanese society, and is practiced by people of diverse social classes. Its rituals represent various art forms, and is a symbol of Japanese pride and identity. As a socio-cultural activity, *chanoyu* is not an end in itself but a spiritual process (Hoover, 1977). Anderson (1991) and Ito (1998), point out that the way of tea is a narrow path in the search for peace, tranquility, harmony, and oneness with self, with others, and with one's surroundings. In the materialistic and fast paced world in which the Japanese live today, *chanoyu* offers calmness and serenity. It provides a sense of belonging and harmony to those who participate in it (Anderson, 1991; Tanaka and Tanaka, 1998). From monasteries to tea pavilions, to the actual living quarters of warriors and nobles, and finally to separate tearooms, the tea ceremony has continued to be a dominant cultural activity in Japanese society. As for the future, Anderson (1991) has brilliantly illustrated the ability of *chanoyu* to adapt to the changing environment and the circumstances in which it has found itself. It is safe to assume, therefore, that the tea ceremony will endure as an important socio-cultural practice, changing as necessary, but remaining prominent in Japanese society.

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GLOSSARY

Chabana: the way of displaying flowers in a tea ceremony
Chado: the way of tea, the spiritual path of *chanoyu*
Chadogu: tea utensils
Chaire: a ceramic container for green thick tea
Chajin: tea enthusiasts; ideals of the tea way permeate their daily lives
Chakin: a narrow white cloth, used for wiping the tea bowl
Chanoyu: the tea ceremony
Chasen: tea whisk (a whisk made of bamboo)
Chashaku: tea scoop, usually made of bamboo
Chashitsu: teahouse
Chazen ichimi: zen and tea are one (a traditional Japanese expression)
Chawan: tea bowl
Fukusa: silk napkin with which the host purifies utensils
Higashi: small sweets customarily served before thin tea
Haiken: part of the tea ceremony during which utensils are examined
Hishaku: water-dipper; a ladle made of bamboo
Honto: host's assistant
Ikebana: the art of flower arrangement
Jaku: tranquility, one of the four principles of chado
Kaiseki: formal tea ceremony during which dinner is also served
Kama: kettle used in the tea ceremony to boil water
Kashi: the general category of Japanese sweets
Kei: respect, one of the four principles of *chado*
Kensui: container for used water
Kishaku: water-dipper for the outdoor basin
Kobukusa: a small piece of silk cloth on which tea utensils are placed while being examined
Koicha: thick tea
Machiai: waiting area where guests wait before entering the tea garden
Mizusashi: a water jar
Mizuya: area where preparations to make tea take place
Mochi: cake made of steamed rice
Nakadachi: a break taken between the kaiseki meal and the preparatin of tea
Nijiriguchi: the entrance through which guests crawl to enter the tea room
Omogashi: moist sweets eaten before drinking thick tea
Oshiki: food tray
Renga: art of linked verse
Rinji: a spontaneous tea gathering or one held at short notice
Roji: a passage linking the waiting area and the tea garden
Sake: rice wine
Sei: purity, one of the four principles of chado
Shikishi: light colored paper on which a poem can be written

Shokyaku:	the guest of honor or main guest
Shosoku:	letters written by famous tea masters, which may be mounted and hung in the tea room
Teishu:	host at a tea ceremony
Tokonomo:	an alcove where flowers, a scroll or other simple decorative objects may be displayed
Usucha:	thin tea
Wa:	harmony, one of the four guiding principles of chado.
Yabunochi:	tea school
Zenki:	act of notifying the host of one's intention to attend a tea ceremony

Stress Management and Conflict Resolution via the Way of Tea

Shelia Fling
Southwest Texas State University

The United Nations declared 2000 the International Year for the Culture of Peace. It has also proclaimed this decade the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World, thus calling for an 11 year focus on "democracy, tolerance, dialogue, reconciliation, and solidarity" (Wadlow, 1999).

The news, however, is filled with violence. Images of ethnic "cleansing" and many armed conflicts in hot spots throughout the world shatter any illusion of peace currently. A hijacking in India and bomb materials seized entering the United States marred millennium celebrations with the specter of terrorism. Gang violence and youth violence send shock waves through the nation. Police brutality is heinous, for example, against minorities in New York City and Chicago. Hate crimes against those of another race or another affectional/sexual orientation than oneself are appalling, for example the gruesome murder of Matthew Sheppard and of at least eight gay men in Texas in less than two years (Bissinger, 1995).

Even in so-called polite society, destructive confrontations occur daily both between and within various social, ethnic, government, business, and religious groups. Physical violence invades the sanctity of the home with wife-battering and child abuse. Verbal violence is common as angry individuals conflict with each other. Internal stresses and frustrations rage within most of us too much of the time.

Can the Japanese tea ceremony offer any remedy for such (1) intrapersonal stress and (2) interpersonal conflict and violence? The current Grand Master of the Urasenke tradition of Tea, Sen Soshitsu XV, has a motto "Peace through sharing a bowl of tea" (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1991a, p. 81). Is this motto realistic? From both historical and contemporary viewpoints, has the Japanese tea ritual fostered peace within the individual and/or between people? Can the Way of Tea play a role in what psychologists call stress management for the individual and conflict prevention and resolution between individuals or groups? This article proposes that indeed it has and can. It also presents the possibility, however, that stress and conflict can sometimes arise within the practice of tea, as surely it will in any endeavor involving human nature. The sincerity and faithfulness with which one follows the principles of tea seem to make all the difference.

Historically, the tea ritual has its earliest roots in sixth century Chinese Ch'an Buddhism and twelfth century Japanese Zen Buddhism and thus is associated with meditation and a peaceful way

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of life (Anderson, 1991, pp. 13-32; Hirota, 1995). In fourteenth century Japan tea drinking became, however, paradoxically both a solemn ceremony in temples and also the occasion for extravagant tasting competitions and gambling for nobles and samurai (Anderson, 1991, p. 26; Sen Soshitsu XV, 1990, pp. 5-6). In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it gradually developed into a very refined ritual, perhaps ironically partly in reaction to the stress of the violence of the Onin Civil War (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1990, pp. 5-6) and partly influenced by the warrior's discipline and strict code of etiquette (Hammitzsch, 1980, pp. 33-36). Samurai left their swords in racks outside the tearoom and crawled in through a low, humbling opening (Hammitzsch, 1980, p. 57). It was supposed to be a place of tranquility where warlords, merchants, and monks met on equal footing to relish silence, the beauties of a garden, exquisite arts and crafts, and a simple bowl of tea together.

The powerful warlord Hideyoshi, however, had a portable teahouse right on the battlefield (Sadler, 1963, p. 129)! The tradition of martial arts with its spirit of *bushido*, the way of the warrior, has used meditative practices like the tea ritual to center oneself and be ready to fight and to die in battle. It may have calmed Hideyoshi to practice tea on the battlefield. The sight of his engaging in this ritual probably inspired his soldiers and unnerved the enemy. Hideyoshi also held military strategy meetings at his tea gatherings at home (Anderson, 1991, p. 37). Finely crafted tea utensils were sometimes given as "arrow money," a kind of tribute to avoid being attacked (Anderson, 1991, p. 36). They were also sometimes used to reward military success (Tadachika, 1976). The practice of tea and its highly valued utensils thus apparently played roles in avoiding violence but also in waging and rewarding it. The mingling of tea, war, and commerce in this period is also illustrated by the wealthy merchants of Sakai, who played an important role in the practice of tea, imported the expensive utensils, and also sold weaponry and other military supplies (Anderson, 1991, p. 33).

The most famous tea master of history, Sen Rikyu, was the son of one of the wealthy Sakai merchants and became a Zen Buddhist. He practiced the Way of Tea in rustic austerity as a meditative path to spiritual enlightenment (Tanigawa, 1976, p. 37; Okakura, 1991, pp. 153-154). He also became, however, the tea master for Nobunaga and, after his death, for Hideyoshi, two famous warlords who each fought to bring Japan under one rule. In contrast to Rikyu's rustic, natural tea-style preference, Hideyoshi wanted elaborate, ostentatious tea ceremonies with gold utensils in a gold tearoom. His military ambition was to dominate all Japan and even invade Korea and China. The conflict over their differences eventually led to Sen Rikyu's house arrest and *seppuku*, ritual suicide by disembowelment, surrounded by 600 (or 3000 depending on the source one reads) enforcing soldiers (Anderson, 1991, p. 47; Murai, 1988, p. 23). Even in the life of this undisputed greatest tea master a mixed picture appears of both tranquility and violence associated with tea. Tea people tend to interpret Rikyu's poems and the stories about him as demonstrating his serenity in the midst of this violence around him.

Turning from the historical to the contemporary practice of tea, is there evidence for its efficacy in stress-management and conflict resolution? Descendent of Sen Rikyu, Grand Master Sen Soshitsu XV was drafted and left home for World War II with a new tea procedure his father had developed for his son's use on the ship with his compatriots in the special attack forces (Anderson, 1991, p. 236). Perhaps, like Hideyoshi, it gave them some dignity and serenity as they faced death. After Japan's devastating defeat, Sen Soshitsu returned home to find his father, the Grand Master then, cordially serving tea to several of the enemy American soldiers. At that point he realized that peace can begin with a bowl of tea prepared with all the heart (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1991b). His work has now spread the Way of Tea to some 30 countries.

Sen Soshitsu XV says the purpose of the Tea-Way is to realize tranquility in communion with others within the environment (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1991a). "Tranquility" implies stress management, and "in communion with others" relates to conflict resolution. Although not the focus of this paper, the phrase "within the environment" could be analyzed in relation to ecological violence against the earth and the violence experienced by four fifths of the world's people from the vastly unequal distribution of wealth. Does the appreciation of nature, its seasons, its flowers, vegetables, etc. in tea practice foster more protective care for the earth? Does the beauty of the costly tea arts and crafts justify their expense when millions starve? What ethic does the tea practitioner follow with regard to frugality and material acquisitiveness?

Focusing instead on the goal of "tranquility," psychological and medical research is showing meditation to be an effective stress-management technique (e.g. Fling, Thomas, & Gallaher, 1981; Kabat-Zinn, Massion, Kristeller, Peterson, Fletcher, Pbert, Lenderking, & Santorelli, 1992; Murphy, 1996). The tea ritual is like a slow-moving meditation that has been compared to T'ai Chi Ch'uan (Cohen, 1976). With much practice, the host learns to be one-pointed in focus yet with an awareness of the whole context of tearoom and guests simultaneously. Each moment's movement and the utensil being handled at that instant flow into awareness and then dissolve into the next moment's awareness. A "body memory" develops that allows a kind of fluidity and emptiness that can lead to a feeling of oneness with the water, fire, utensil, guest, all. The oneness of guest and host, for example, is hinted in the Zen expression *muhinshu* composed of *mu* (nothingness), *hin* (guest), and *shu* (host). As both are "no-thing," they are one (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1991a, p. 40).

The guests, having entered through a lovely garden and sitting quietly in an uncluttered, natural space with the sound of the water's boiling and the fragrance of incense, may feel a profound serenity. They may follow the flowing movements of the host, while also focusing on each delicacy and utensil that comes to them. Aware of only the present moment, they may experience the emptiness and oneness spoken of in Zen. Ideally the consciousness developed in these simple acts of preparing and drinking tea can generalize to everything that one does (Sen Soshitsu XV, 1990,

p. 4). Considering these effects on host and guests, psychologists might well recommend the practice of tea as a practical stress-management technique, much like meditation. It can have even more appeal to some than does motionless, solitary meditation because of the tea ritual's movement and direct relatedness with other people, the arts, and nature.

At the same time, preparations for a tea event can be extremely elaborate and complex, requiring many hours and even days of very taxing food preparation, unpacking utensils, readying supplies, putting on kimono, etc. Practitioners can sometimes become rushed and intense as the time grows near and be exhausted afterward. Even then and even for a novice, there may have been those moments of seemingly perfect tranquility, and the tired, contented relief afterward may include something like the sense of accomplishment in creating beauty that a pianist feels after a vigorous concert preceded by hours of disciplined rehearsal. Sitting on the floor for several hours can become extremely painful for the knees and feet. Wearing kimono with several layers of fabric in hot, humid weather can also be distracting to any meditative state. The Way of Tea thus seems to have the potential to be very stressful as well as stress reducing.

Some have apparently progressed to the point of maintaining equanimity and even light-hearted humor throughout such taxing conditions, however. They are almost unfailingly the most dedicated and advanced tea people. They seem to experience the challenge of the work and discipline as eustress (positive stress) rather than distress. Indeed their tea practice seems to generalize to an equanimity maintained throughout the stressors encountered in the rest of life outside the tea room. Tomoko Sen, late wife of the Grand Master and beloved Okusama of Urasenke students, illustrated this in her lesson about the *bashira*. The bashira is a central pole in a pagoda that hangs freely from the apex in such a way that it moves in response to an earthquake and then returns to equilibrium, thus giving stability to the edifice. Okusama vividly and beautifully demonstrated such flexibility and centeredness in her own gentle spirit.

Turning now from the issue of peace within oneself and returning to Sen Soshitsu XV's phrase "in communion with others" bring to focus the second issue of this article. Can the Way of Tea contribute to conflict prevention and resolution between people? The four principles of tea were covered in a previous article (Fling, 1998, pp. 30-31) and paper (Turay, 1999). The first is harmony. A host may smooth a conflictual relationship by careful selection of guests to promote renewed harmony. Certain tea exercises that involve spontaneity and flexibility in changing roles provide unifying group experiences in coordination and cooperation with others. These often feel like a kind of harmonious, interwoven dance. Even working in the *mizuya* (tea kitchen) ideally is a masterpiece of harmonious efficiency between people.

With regard to the second principle of respect, the practices of bowing and turning a utensil's design toward the other person seem more than mere form. Research has shown that one's nonverbal

behavior can affect one's feelings and cognitions (Laird, 1974; Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976). In the tea setting, such procedures may actually foster respect and minimize potential for conflict.

Although polite, respectful words and demeanor definitely seem to predominate, words in the tea world do not always sound perfectly harmonious and respectful. Students are sometimes anxious about seemingly harsh correction from a *kibishii* (strict) *sensei* (teacher) or *sempai* (senior student). Later, of course, they may come to value this, knowing they will never forget a sharply corrected point in the procedure. Also teachers are often *yasashii*, easy-going and even humorous in their corrections, creating a pleasant, relaxed atmosphere. The most advanced and dedicated practitioners seem to demonstrate reliably the values of harmony and respect. Perhaps they have been shaped by their years of practice of the Way.

The third principle, purity, refers not only to actual and ceremonial purity of the tea setting and utensils but also to purity of the heart and mind. Both host and guest should prepare and participate with purity of intention without desire for gain or favor. Fling (1998) covered steps in the procedure that can be helpful symbolic reminders of this. Surely some tea students, being human, will sometimes maneuver or even overtly bicker over utensils, role, and status (Mori, 1992). Most advanced practitioners seem, however, consistently to observe the value of a pure heart, of *sunao* or sincere, humble compliance, cooperating and putting the other before oneself.

The fourth principle is tranquility or *satori* or enlightenment itself. It is not something to focus on or strive for but a natural result of following the first three principles, harmony, respect, and purity. To the extent that one tastes or glimpses even a "mini-enlightenment" experience, more harmony, respect, and purity should accrue, all of which should lead to less anger, conflict, and violence. Sen Rikyu spoke of entering the serenity of nothingness and then returning to the world to behold that everyone and everything, even a tiny blade of grass, share that glorious nothingness as the basis of being. He said that thus we cannot help bowing to each other (Kobori, 1988)!

At the fiftieth anniversary of Urasenke Tankokai (World Views of the Way of Tea, 1991), leaders of twenty-one countries showed interest in the Way of Tea. Sen Soshitsu asked if the little respectful acts in the tea ritual can help transcend national borders, ethnic disputes, and racial discrimination. Sun Ping Hua of Beijing cited an ancient Chinese proverb that mutual trust between people arises not from drinking sake but sharing tea. Edard Shevardnadze of Moscow said that tea is a wonderful tradition, a private sector diplomacy that can help deepen international understanding and bring people of the world closer.

In conclusion, evidence from both historical and contemporary practice suggests that the meditative Tea Way can indeed provide inner tranquility, even in the midst of violence. In addition to this benefit of stress-management within the individual, tea practice can also contribute to the

prevention and resolution of conflict between people. At a recent tea conference, one father shared how sharing tea practice had facilitated his strained relationship with his son.

At the same time, as with any challenging endeavor that requires rigorous discipline and cooperation from fallible human beings, tea can also be the occasion for intrapersonal stress and interpersonal conflict. One can abuse the practice of tea for the motivation of status, for example, accumulating and displaying utensils and kimono for self-glorification rather than aesthetic appreciation and sharing. One can become very anxious about pleasing or impressing a teacher or guest and about hosting gatherings perfectly instead of enjoyably. One can also become competitive and irritable with others.

The Tea Way can be compared to the power of nuclear energy or of religion for good or for ill. Like them, it can be used for peace and healing, or it can be abused in ways that lead to stress, destructive conflict, and even violence. The hurtful potential is not inherent in the religion, nuclear energy, or Tea Way itself, but in the motives and means of fallible human beings. As discussed in this article, the determining factor is the person. Dedicated tea people who faithfully follow the principles of tea manifest its effectiveness in helping them prevent and manage stress and conflict. Students who persevere become shaped in this direction.

Concluding dogmatically that the tea ritual is a panacea for all human foibles would seem contrary to the principles of tea itself. One "follows" and "practices" the Way of Tea, striving to pursue the principles of harmony, respect, and purity, never claiming to have actually achieved them. As a natural consequence, the fourth principle, inner tranquility grows and one may at least glimpse enlightenment. As Soto Zen's Dogen taught, the practice itself or "just sitting" **is** enlightenment (e.g., Okumura, 1990, p. 74).

One is always a beginner in tea, going from one to ten and beginning at one again. One never claims to achieve perfection with absolute freedom from stress but rather increases in the flexibility to yield, flow, and adapt, thus converting stressors to growth-producing eustress instead of distress. Likewise, one is not totally free from conflict with others but learns to creatively redirect the energy generated in differences which arise or attacks that come. If one sincerely pursues the four principles of the Way of Tea, one will surely manifest the wisdom of the One and compassion for the Many (Suzuki, 1999) and thus reduce both stress and conflict.

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From Harmony to Confrontation in Japanese Advertising

Joseph P. Helgert
Grand Valley State University

COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING DEBUTS IN JAPAN

Comparative advertising is a type of marketing communication that involves two types of selling messages. Factual advertisements contrast competitive product features with superior features of the sponsor's product. Argumentative advertisements use reasoning or emotional appeals to distinguish the sponsor's product from competitors. Until very recently, Japanese companies avoided comparative advertising, considering it taboo. This avoidance stems from the cultural caveat that Japanese companies should try to maintain "harmony." In fact, before 1986, comparative advertising was illegal in Japan. The Japan Fair Trade Commission prohibited comparative advertising, viewing it as similar to slander.

This aversion to comparative advertising presented a difficult situation to American companies wishing to enter the Japanese markets. Since comparative ads played a major role in American advertising, would they be a necessary ingredient for advertising in Japan as well? So, despite the Japanese cultural ban on comparative advertising, American advertising agencies moved into Japanese markets and gradually introduced comparative ads. As a result, the American advertisers altered the Japanese advertising environment by making comparative advertising acceptable.

The first Japanese competitive ads were launched by Pepsi-Cola, which was also the first soft drink product to position itself competitively against Coca-Cola. In 1991, Pepsi extended its "Pepsi Challenge" advertising campaign into Japan with the intention of raiding Coca-Cola market share. Japanese supermarkets held "taste comparisons" similar to those implemented so successfully in the United States. These events heralded the beginning of Japanese-style "challenge advertising." This article describes the process of challenge advertising in Japan.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: "HARMONY" DOCTRINE HAS REGULATED BUSINESS FOR CENTURIES

Crown Prince Shotoku Taishishi (Prince of Sagely Virtue, 574-622), who had significant impact on Japanese culture during his time, continues to influence Japanese society even today through his ideas about contemporary marketing, commerce and advertising practice (Hiromichi, 1988; Lu, 1974; Sansom, 1958; Tsunoda, 1958). As a regent for empress Suiko (593-628), Prince Shotoku

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promoted the growth of Buddhism, improved relations with China, and promoted learning as a way of understanding the world. He also used his personal religious beliefs as a basis for political reform in Japan (Sansom, 1958).

Shotoku sought to imbue politics with the civilizing influence of his religion. In the year 604, at just 21 years of age, Prince Shotoku championed a document known as the *Constitution of Seventeen Articles*. The document, although not accepted by some historians as the prince's own work, is a set of moral precepts, political principles and normative injunctions. The Constitution provided a basis for the political reform sought at the time. It also paved the way for the eventual success of subsequent reforms (Lu, 1974). Within this document are clues to the values under which Japanese business operates.

The Constitution's first article most captures the business conduct sentiment that still influences behavior today. Harmony is to be valued and cherished, and opposition for opposition sake must be avoided as a matter of principle. All men are influenced by partisanship: few are intelligent or sagacious. If those above are harmonious and those below are friendly and cordial, there is concord in the discussion of business, reason will prevail, and there will be nothing that cannot be accomplished (Ashton, 1972, pp.11; 128-33).

ADVERTISING REGULATIONS RESPOND TO MARKET PRESSURE

Shotoku's constitution is the basis for the Japanese avoidance of comparative advertising. The document presents the historical, cultural caveat that Japanese companies should try to maintain "harmony." The Constitution also prescribes the general values of *kenkyo* (modesty) and *omoiyari* (being considerate) (Hasegawa, 1995, pp. 11-12). Because of these principles, Japanese companies avoided comparative advertising and considered it taboo. In fact, until 1986, comparative advertising was illegal. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) prohibited comparative advertising, viewing it as similar to slander.

However in 1986, the JFTC altered course, for two reasons: (1) The JFTC was concerned about the staggering trade surplus with the United States, and (2) Foreign firms complained that the ban hampered effective advertising efforts.

Seeman (1986) adds that foreign corporations, American in particular, had long complained that the ban on comparative advertising made selling products in Japan difficult. During the summer of 1985, the Japanese government responded to these foreign (especially American) complaints by advancing a "market-opening package." The package included a series of trade and tariff changes that allowed foreign companies more access to Japanese markets.

While the Japanese government prepared its market-opening package, foreign companies repeatedly complained that restrictions on comparative advertising constituted a trade barrier. In September 1986, the JFTC dispatched members of affiliated foundations to the United States. Here they studied how United States firms practiced comparative advertising (Seeman, 1996). Later, the JFTC prepared guidelines for suitable comparative advertising, based on factual data. The guidelines banned ads that denigrated competitive products.

However, in its 1986 ruling, the JFTC lifted the ban and created guidelines for comparative advertising. The guidelines required factual proof to support comparisons in ads. Thus firms received permission to make advertisements showing where their products were superior to competitors.

The Birth and Development of Japanese Competitive Ads

Among foreign competitors, Pepsi was the first soft drink product to position itself competitively against Coke. Cooper-Chen (1997) reports on the Pepsi-Cola effort to raid market share from Coca-Cola: In 1991, Pepsi introduced its "Pepsi Challenge" advertising campaign into Japan. Japanese supermarkets held "taste comparisons" similar to those implemented so successfully in the United States.

A short-lived joint venture between United States ad agency McCann-Erickson and Japanese agency Hakuhodo deve'oped the "Pepsi Challenge" concept. Initially, television stations rejected the television ads, in which Diet Pepsi "challenges" Diet Coke. However, Japanese consumers loved the ads. Meanwhile, the JFTC stated that the ads were legal. The JFTC reasoned that the ads were factual, and did not slander Coke (Barrager, 1996).

In one ad, popular American rapster MC Hammer regains his dance rhythm after selecting Pepsi instead of Coke. Consumers watched these ads as if they were viewing a baseball game, and the ads became a favorite pastime. Viewers requested the spots, and television stations sent them copies.

In 1992, Pepsi redirected its campaign to newspapers. The popular ads helped the company make further headway against Coke. Examples of text from this ad campaign follow.

Pepsi ad -- Example 1

Research = Concerning the uneconomical DIET PEPSI

Report = In order to consume the same amount of calories as Coca-Cola Light (Diet Coke), you must drink 12 cans of DIET PEPSI.

Pepsi ad -- Example 2

For those who want to consume more calories.

Caution = DIET PEPSI cannot be recommended.

Suggestion = We recommend COCA-COLA Light (Diet Coke).

Reason = DIET PEPSI has only one twelfth of the calories in Coca-Cola Light (Diet Coke).

The Pepsi market gains impressed observers in General Motors management. In 1992, General Motors produced its own line of "challenge ads." In a newspaper ad, GM factually compared the product features of a Pontiac with the competing model from Honda:

General Motors ad -- Example 1

Cadillac 3 years 100,000 km, Celsio 3 years 60,000 km.

The same peace of mind.

General Motors ad -- Example 2

Regal sedan 0.85 incidents, Honda Legend 0.85 incidents. (Malfunction rate)

The same reliability.

General Motors ad -- Example 3

Please examine the safety features of the Pontiac Bonneville SSS and the Legend

General Motors ad -- Example 4

Please compare the fuel economy of the Cadillac Seville with that of the Infiniti Q45.

General Motors ad -- Example 5

The joy of those who grip the steering wheel.

Cadillac Seville

Maskery (1995) reports on a 1995 GM ad depicting a Cadillac Seville with a headline asking consumers to "compare our Seville's fuel efficiency with Infiniti's." A Nissan Infiniti Q45 lurks in the background of the newspaper photograph. The ad copy reads:

Loaded with the North Star System V8 4.6 liters DOHC 32V.

All for the search for new driving comfort.

Not to be outdone by GM, Ford ran its own comparative ad that posed a rhetorical question to Ford's chief rival Volkswagen: "Why is the Volkswagen Golf so expensive in Japan?" Volkswagen immediately protested, but by then, the advertising industry had turned a corner. The "Japanese-style comparative ads" had become less factual and more argumentative in nature.

In 1993, comparative advertising spread from cars to computers. Barrager (1993) reports on the rivalry of personal computer manufacturers NEC and Compaq. American computer manufacturer Compaq entered the Japanese market with a low-price strategy. NEC responded by promoting its advantage of Japanese-language software.

CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE ADS STIMULATED CULTURAL CHANGES

In spite of Prince Shotoku's precepts, Japan adapted to open conflict in the marketplace. Inoue (1996) asserts that advertising industry deregulation was a major influence. He cites the 1986 Japan Fair Trade Association ruling as the beginning of deregulation.

However, deregulation played a minor role. The true prime mover was the introduction of American-style comparative advertising messages. These messages represent a cultural force. Implicit in the messages were competitive market values that impacted Japanese society in two ways: The new messages not only persuaded consumers to buy, but also enhanced the marketing process.

Over time, the new messages bypassed earlier cultural taboos against comparative advertising. Where the market went, the marketing rules followed. Thus the strongest motivator of the change was culture, rather than politics or economics.

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BOOK REVIEW

Richard Frank's *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*

Reviewed by Jeff Roberts; Tennessee Tech University

Richard B. Frank promises, in the introduction to *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*, "to prevent the distortions that inevitably stem from a failure to respect the autonomy that Japanese decision makers exercised in choosing military and diplomatic strategies" (p. xviii). Frank delivers, using Japanese sources to illuminate the thoughts and actions of the leadership in Tokyo, and Washington, through 1945. Scholars of Japan may debate individual arguments, but few will dispute that Frank has offered much useful information and insightful analysis.

Frank's initial chapter is a powerful, gripping portend which properly places the atomic bombs in wartime context. He recounts the Tokyo fire raid in a fashion vaguely reminiscent of John Hersey's Hiroshima. Stories of individuals struggling to battle the firestorms, then flee them, are followed by graphic depictions of corpses and the charred, peeling flesh of the living. Frank ominously concludes by noting that the raid had no perceivable impact on the Japanese leadership, which remained committed to a defense of the homeland, still hoping that by making the costs prohibitive, they could secure a compromise peace.

Frank's subsequent treatment of the ongoing affairs within the Japanese high command and government is judicious. He ultimately questions whether any member of the Japanese Supreme Council, save perhaps Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, was committed to anything approaching unconditional surrender in an urgent way. He uses the recently discovered Showa Tenno Dohuhakuroku (The Showa Emperor's Monologue) to show that even Hirohito was at best a belated, restrained peace advocate who finally gave in only out of fear of domestic turmoil and the atomic bombs. Frank claims it "fantasy, not history, to believe that the end of the war was at hand before the use of the atomic bomb" (p. 239).

Historians may question whether Frank's conclusions are fundamentally different from those of Robert Butow's 1954 classic Japan's Decision to Surrender (I would argue they are not). Yet Frank does address directly modern revisionist arguments which had not taken root in earlier times. Regarding Japanese diplomatic initiatives toward the USSR, both authors dismiss them as of little importance, lacking official endorsement and concrete terms, and dwarfed among a gaggle of transmissions which promised suicidal resistance. But Frank goes further in his examination of exchanges between Togo and ambassador Naotake Sato (which Americans read via MAGIC). He notes how Sato rather bruskly dismissed Togo's initiative as illusory, and suggested unconditional surrender with one provision—maintenance of the imperial institution. Togo rejected this idea. Frank concludes, contrary to revisionist contentions, that an earlier guarantee of the emperor's position

would not have brought peace. "If Togo, the most vigorous advocate . . . of ending the war promptly dismissed such a proposal, there is no rational prospect that it would have won support from any of the other members of the Supreme Council" (p. 344).

Frank similarly calls to task those who advocate a continued bombing and blockade strategy, by noting that the carnage already wrought on Japan would have continued while the specter of starvation on a massive scale loomed. He also reinforces the work of Gavan Daws and Robert Newman, among others in noting the suffering of subject peoples, who had perished at a rate approaching 250,000 per month as the war reached its climax, and would have continued to die throughout a blockade. Frank sees no alternative to the atomic bombs which would have promptly ended the war or mitigated the death and suffering.

Frank dismisses "atomic diplomacy" advocates, claiming Cold War advantages a minimal, even negligible factor among those which led the American leadership to employ the bombs. More important, Frank questions both the plausibility, and the rectitude, of allowing the Soviet invasion of Manchuria to run its course before using atomic bombs. Frank essentially chides those who advocate waiting as a humanitarian option, noting that the Manchurian campaign cost the lives of 12,000 Soviet and 84,000 Japanese soldiers in just a few short weeks. Furthermore, of more than 2,726,000 Japanese nationals captured by the Soviets, only 2,379,000 were ever repatriated. When combined, deaths from the Soviets surpass "all but the most exaggerated tolls attributed to the atomic bombs" (p. 356). Given Soviet plans to seize Hokkaido had the war continued, hundreds of thousands more would have died amidst the fighting and subsequent occupation.

Finally, Frank doubts whether Soviet intervention by itself would have produced a rapid surrender, and fears a more ominous result. He notes how Japanese officials interviewed after the war claimed the bombs key to capitulation, as they undermined plans to defend the home islands and gave the military a technological excuse to quit. Few mentioned the Soviets as a fundamental reason for surrender. Frank regards both bombings as essential in the surrender. He counters those who regard the Nagasaki bomb as superfluous, noting that it undermined arguments that the American supply of weapons was sparse. In the wake of Hiroshima, the Japanese military minimized the bomb's effects, attempted to trumpet countermeasures, and were not swayed from their course. It took Nagasaki "to convince the militarists that more than one bomb was available" (p. 348 fn).

Frank further suggests that had the Soviet invasion transpired without the bombs, the militarists in the Japanese government might have initiated plans to declare martial law and move Imperial Headquarters into the mountains, from whence, with the emperor captive and civilian politicians rendered impotent, they could continue the war indefinitely, even if it meant national suicide. Had the army seized such an ascendant position, "it is my no means obvious that the war would have terminated in an organized Japanese surrender" (p. 356).

Frank does well to discuss the power of Japanese militarists, noting both legal and extralegal means (such as control of information and threats of terror) whereby they maintained power. Like Butow before him, Frank sees a real danger of a military coup both before and after the emperor recommended peace. Frank disagrees, however, as to which high-ranking officer did the most to ensure that the Army obeyed the Imperial Decision. Where Butow stressed Korechika Anami's role, (particularly his refusal to resign his position as war minister, which would have collapsed the cabinet) Frank interestingly suggests that Yoshijiro Umezu, Torashiro Kawabe and Tadaichi Wakamatsu also played critical roles. He also offers tempered suggestion (admitting the record is incomplete) that Anami may have flirted with supporting those intent on defying the emperor's wishes (p. 317).

Perhaps most interesting among his military revelations is the key role played by General Shunroku Hata, the commander of the Japanese Second Army, entrusted with defense of Kyushu, and stationed at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. (Its position there, for what it is worth, likely gave Hiroshima "the highest density of servicemen to civilians among Japan's large urban areas" (p. 263). This survivor of the bombing, which killed one-third of his staff and wounded an equal number), tearfully spoke in the presence of the emperor: "He had no confidence in repulsing the enemy landing, he said, and he did not dispute the Emperor's decision to accept the Potsdam declaration" (p. 314). In the wake of this, the heretofore belligerent high command rather meekly accepted the decision as well.

Frank also discusses civilian mobilization, concluding that the high command "willfully consigned hundreds of thousands of their countrymen to death. Moreover, by deliberately eliminating any distinction between combatants and noncombatants, they would compel Americans to treat all Japanese as combatants or fail to do so at their peril. It was a recipe for extinction" (p. 190).

Frank further suggests that said civilians would serve as willing accomplices to the carnage. Of all the quotes within *Downfall*, none are as powerful as the reactions of some Hiroshima citizens to the news of the surrender. From within the hospital, they exclaim:

> "Only a coward would back out now"
>
> "There is a limit to deceiving us"
>
> "I would rather die than be defeated"
>
> "What have we been suffering for?"
>
> "Those who died can't go to heaven in peace now"
>
> "Many who had been strong advocates for peace and others who had lost their taste for war . . . were now shouting for the war to continue. The one word—surrender—had produced a greater shock than the bombing of our city" (p. 321).

Frank is usually even-handed in assessing American leadership, treating even the controversial James Byrnes and Curtis LeMay with fairness. In LeMay's case, for example, he gives due attention to the failures of the air campaign before his arrival, European precedents of civilian destruction, and Japanese home-industry dispersal, while noting that LeMay never fully abandoned precision strikes, but continued to attempt them when circumstances allowed. In chapter after chapter, we numbingly learn of mission after mission, the number of planes involved, the tonnage, the losses and the damage. While this may exhaust a reader's patience at times, it serves to drive home the point that the atomic bomb runs were, both of distinguishable impact, and also just another mission.

Downfall becomes more problematic when Frank concludes that American naval leaders, long supportive of a blockade strategy, would have trumped the Kyushu operation by calling for reassessments of potential invasion casualties. This is an interesting, albeit conjectural argument. Perhaps naval opposition, Soviet advances, typhoons, or a switch in targeting priorities might have altered OLYMPIC. Yet other factors, some of which Frank mentions (Douglas MacArthur's dismissal of ULTRA evidence and desire to lead the invasion, Marshall's preference for direct assault, home-front impatience, desire to drive home unconditional surrender, etc.) and others which he ignores (sheer military momentum, Truman's greater trust in Marshall vis-a-vis his naval counterparts, desire to beat the winter weather, failures of peripheral strategies in Europe, etc.) might argue otherwise.

Had the invasion gone in, Frank clearly does not anticipate a million-man massacre of Americans. His supports his argument not by condemning the more somber forecasts as fabrications or accusing American politicians of having orchestrated myth, but by pointing to the professionalism and material advantages beholden to the American forces, and the illogic of the Japanese defensive plans. Hinged upon massed counterattacks against the bridgehead, Ketsu-Go would have created a target-rich environment and a slaughter reminiscent of the banzai charges of earlier campaigns. Frank suggests as many as 630,000 Japanese casualties among the army and civilian auxiliaries in even a limited campaign.

While predicting both massacre and imminent economic collapse Frank's assessment of the Japanese situation is balanced, noting strengths (terrain advantages, time to and skill in preparing fortifications, and of course the kamikazes) as well as weaknesses. He estimates American casualties at 140,000 to176,000 — not counting POW losses, and strongly suggests that orders to annihilate POWs were issued, but destroyed between the surrender and occupation (p. 328 fn). As to whether this might have induced a compromise peace, Frank wisely leaves this question in abeyance. He takes particular offense, however, at those who deride American servicemen for believing that the bomb saved their lives, claiming that those in the invasion force "had solid grounds for this belief.

The other men earmarked for Olympic," Frank continued, "whatever their job, would have become unwilling participants in a gigantic and deadly game of kamikaze roulette where random chance determined who lived and who died" (p. 195).

While his assessment of OLYMPIC's likely course is compelling, Frank's section on contemporary casualty projections (p. 136 fn) is rather confusing and arguably the most disappointing section of the book. Frank's claim that "Truman never got an unambiguous or unanimous answer to his fundamental question about casualties" (p. 144) seems to miss the point: There was no unambiguous or unanimous answer. Truman received lots of projections, most involving ratios or percentages, and all dependent on the duration of the campaign and hence open to speculation. Yet some were given to astronomical figures.

Frank has likely leaned too heavily, or is at least reluctant to break fully from the interpretations of Barton Bernstein, who has long rejected the idea that Truman ever received exceedingly high casualty predictions. While Frank seems to doubt Bernstein's extreme conclusion, cites "firm evidence that the specter of huge casualties was a real concern before the war ended" (p. 342), and contradicts some of Bernstein's other work elsewhere in *Downfall*, he still offers Bernstein robust praise in both acknowledgments (p. xii) and text (p. 257). Frank also unfairly belittles the work of D. M. Giangreco, whose prize winning article casts its argument for high numbers far beyond the one set of documents upon which Frank and Bernstein merely offer an alternative interpretation (p. 30 fn).

Frank's aspersions that George Marshall mendaciously denied Truman access to "sobering estimates" (p. 146) prior to Potsdam are similarly questionable. One should remember that Marshall was ever the invasion-optimist (sanctioning, for example, cross-channel attacks into France as early as 1942!), and likely regarded the estimates of June as unduly pessimistic. That he later alerted Truman to the build-up on Kyushu (even Frank finds it absurd to believe that Marshall did not update the President at Potsdam) seems ample reinforcement of Marshall's reputation for candor.

In retrospect, one could perhaps wish for a more sustained analysis of the Japanese military's hold on society, replete with examples. Such is also the case with the rather vague discussion of the emperor's role within the government. Frank claims "the Emperor was no mere ceremonial symbol" (p. 88) but does not really state what he was, save an occasional dupe of a military which supplied him sanitized information and ignored his wishes when they conflicted with policy. One could further wish for a more extended analysis of the civilian willingness to submit to military demands.

Dwelling on controversial interpretations, desired additions, assorted peeves (unnumbered footnotes, uninspiring maps) or minor errors (of which there are few) would not be fair to a book that has more strengths than weaknesses. Chief among the former, I would argue, is Frank's placement of the bombing campaign in the context of the war generally, and unconditional surrender policy

specifically. "It was not just a handful of men in rogue governments who flaunted vile ideologies," he writes, "whole populations imbibed these beliefs and acted as willing acolytes. Unconditional surrender and vast physical destruction would sear the price of aggression into the minds of the German and Japanese peoples" (p. 337).

From thence Frank subsequently concludes that "the deaths actually incurred in ending the war were not gratuitous. American goals were not simply victory but peace. Had American leaders in 1945 been assured that Japan and the United States would pass two generations in tranquility and still look forward with no prospect of future conflict, they would have believed their hard choices had been vindicated—and so should we" (p. 360).

Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire
by Richard Frank
Published by Random House, New York © 1999

FILM REVIEW

Akira Kurosawa's *Dreams*

Reviewed by Ileana B. Leavens; Seattle Central Community College

The film consists of eight short stories each running about fifteen minutes. Each is unique as to time and place, but they are all thematically connected. The first, "Sunshine Through the Rain," introduces the hero, a child who disobeys his mother's command against witnessing a foxes' wedding procession. Being caught observing, the boy has to either ask the foxes' forgiveness or commit *seppuku*. The second story "The Peach Orchard" shows the boy again, confronting the spirits of the peach orchard his parents have cut down, but the spirits allow him to see the orchard in bloom once more. Connections between these two stories are obvious. In the third story, "The Blizzard," the hero and his team are caught in a blizzard while attempting to climb a mountain. Surrounded by blinding snow and sudden avalanches they display both arrogance and angst. It is only when the hero, lured by death rejects it, that he is able to save the group. The next episode "The Tunnel" although thematically connected with the earlier one, introduces the opposite theme: the hero has led all his soldiers into death. As ghosts they return to confront their leader, whose orders they still obey. The next story "Crows," comes as a surprise: it deals with Van Gogh and is in English. In contrast to the earlier stories in which the hero's relation to nature and his fellow men are emphasized, here the "I"—the personal—predominates. Van Gogh does not speak of or relates to others: he is concerned only with himself, his emotions and his struggles. As in the first three episodes the hero appears against a landscape background, in this case that of Arles; but soon he is

seen going through Van Gogh's paintings. The contrast between the reality of the man and that of the painting, in which brushwork and texture are emphasized, is a visual treat. But in this idyllic setting, a locomotive intrudes. It is a product of western industrialization and a metaphor for Van Gogh's self-destruction.

"Crows" is a turning point in the film. In the previous episodes Kurosawa had referred to death, (*seppuko*, peach orchard, blizzard, war), but always in relation to personal responsibilities. In "Crows," death is represented as an impersonal machine. "Mount Fuji in Red" introduces the logical end of the machine's superiority: thousands are killed from a meltdown of nuclear reactors behind Mt Fuji and the mountain's own eruption adds to the holocaust. This story emphasizes man's arrogance and stupidity, themes that had been hinted at earlier, and reappear in "The Weeping Demon." A bleak uninhabitable mountain provides the setting for a post-nuclear world populated by human mutations and monstrous plants. In this travesty, where demons continue to adhere to an established hierarchy, Kurosawa presents a scathing comment on social mores. In the last story, "The Village of the Watermills," Kurosawa clearly presents his main theme: mankind is an integral part of nature and needs to be in harmony with it. This harmony however presupposes that respect be given to everything, animate and inanimate. But respect includes a sense of responsibility to others and to oneself. This last story is related to the first one: a funeral procession echoes that of the foxes wedding; the river recalls the sound of rain. The first story introduces the theme of intellectual curiosity, (man needs to see, to discover and thereby control); the following stories show the consequences; this last story points to a simpler existence in which the natural order of life and death, day and night is accepted. But even here there is a mechanical contraption: the watermill. A new cycle will begin.

The eight episodes are variations of Kurosawa's main theme, but the overall impact of the film arises from synesthesia: mood, action, natural sounds, music, color and composition are all connected. An example will suffice: in "The Blizzard" motion is painfully slow as the climbers struggle through knee-deep snow, gasping for breath, pitted against avalanches and roaring wind. They can only shout to each other, in this monochromatic world of snow and shapeless forms, which at times disappear from view. Long range and close range photography tie the visual and acoustic elements to represent man's insignificance. The mountain is shown clearly, the men appear as mere blobs against the white background; even when seen in close range, their heavy breathing is emphasized, not their faces.

I show this film at Seattle Central Community College to students in Art 255, Survey of Non-western Art. It is a three-month course dealing with selected topics from Indian, Chinese and Japanese art. Students are taught to recognize differences in styles without memorization, and to familiarize themselves with Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, Daoism, and Confucius— whose *Analects*

is required reading. Japanese aesthetics are studied via the concepts of *wabi*, *sabi*, *miyabi*, and *mono no aware*, which are discussed in class and examples given. The students also learn about sensitivity and synesthesia. The former is introduced by readings from the *Tale of Genji*; the latter is illustrated by examples from Sei Shonagon's *Pillow Book*. Kurosawa's film reflects all these.

As a pedagogical tool, *Dreams* gives students the opportunity to view a film intellectually and aesthetically. Inquiring minds will relate to how *Dreams* questions premises we take for granted. Are science and technology a measure of progress? Is control of nature necessary or can we live in harmony with it? Can we experience our surroundings beyond the merely superficial, and try to understand their significance? And for those aesthetically oriented this incredibly beautiful film is a superb response to the mass produced, and mass consumed images that permeate our daily life.

Akira Kurosawa: *Dreams*, (Yume) 1990
Akira Kurosawa: Producer and director
Warner Bros.: USA distributor

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To be considered for publication in the Japan Studies Association Journal, a manuscript must not have been previously published and should be on a topic of appeal to readers of the journal—most of whom have Japan as an *interest* area rather than an area of *expertise*.

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